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THE FAILURE OF THE FREEDOM-BASED AND
UTILITARIAN ARGUMENTS FOR ASSISTED SUICIDE
BY Scorr FITZGIBBON'
"Judge freedom to be happiness and courage to be freedom." 2
In recent years, numerous initiatives have been launched to promote
physician-assisted suicide. Numerous statutes have been proposed,3 and
one (in Oregon) has been enacted.4 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit5 and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit6 were recently persuaded to recognize constitutionally protected
rights to assisted suicide, although their decisions have been reversed by the
1. Thanks are extended, for assistance on this or on a predecessor article, to Harold
Berman, Robert W. Woodruff Professor, Emory University School of Law and Ames
Professor Emeritus, Harvard Law School; Professor Gerard Bradley, Notre Dame Law
School; John E. Coons, Bridges Professor Emeritus, University of California at Berkeley
School of Law; John Finnis, FBA, Professor of Law and Legal Philosophy, University of
Oxford, Biolchini Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame; Jane Greenlaw, Associate
Professor and Director, Division ofthe Medical Humanities, University of Rochester Medical
Center; Germain Grisez, The Reverend Harry J. Flynn Professor of Christian Ethics, Mount
St. Mary's College; Professor M. Cathleen Kaveny, Notre Dame Law School; Kwan Kew
Lai, M.D., Associate Professor of Medicine, University of Massachusetts Medical School;
Aviam Soifer, Dean and Professor of Law, Boston College Law School; and Jonathan
Thomas, Collection Development Librarian, Boston College Law School. Further thanks are
extended to Suzanne Hedstrom, University of Massachusetts Medial Center; and Lisa
Lawrence, Colbe Mazzarella, Dawn O'Brien, and Tina Schaper of Boston College Law
School, who provided excellent research assistance.
2. Pericles' funeral oration, in Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, book
two, p. 43 (vol. one of the Loeb Classics edition, Charles Forster Smith, tr., 1928). 1 have
altered the first word from "judging" to "judge." This does not distort Pericles' point, which
is imperative in meaning if not in mood. The entire sentence is: "Do you, therefore, now
make these men your examples, and judging freedom to be happiness and courage to be
freedom, be not too anxious about the dangers of war."
3. E.g., A.B. 1080, 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1995); H.R. 1308, 60th Leg., 1st Sess.
(Colo. 1995); S. 334, 1995 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Conn. 1995); H.R. 552, 117th Leg., Ist Sess.
(Me. 1995); H.R.. 933, 1995 Leg. Sess. (Md. 1995); H-1543 (Mass. 1996); H.R. 3173, 179th
Leg., 1st Sess. (Mass. 1995); H.R. 4134,88th Leg., 1995 Sess. (Mich. 1995); H.R. 339, 1995
Reg. Sess. (N.H. 1995); S. 446, 42d Leg., Ist Sess. (N.M. 1995); S. 5596, 54th Leg., 1996
Sess. (Wash. 1995).
4. Oregon Death with Dignity Act, Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 127.800-897 (1995).
5. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (1996), rev'd. sub nom.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
6. Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (1996), rev'd., 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
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Supreme Court.7 An international organization called the World Federation
of Right-to-Die Societies furthers such efforts in other countries.
8
The two most common justifications for such initiatives are that assisted
suicide enhances freedom or liberty, and that it maximizes utility. Would
freedom be enhanced by the practice of physician assistance in suicide or by
legal doctrines permitting it? Would utility be maximized?
Walk into a room containing the corpse of a recent suicide surrounded by
his bewildered friends and relatives and you may not readily identify it as
a scene of liberation and rejoicing. This article concludes that your intuition
is correct: that assisted suicide does not enhance freedom or promote utility.
PART ONE: FREEDOM
"[Miany persons ... love liberty better than they understand it."
9
I. INTRODUCTION
Initiatives promoting assisted suicide are often supported with assertions
that they increase freedom or liberty. The recent Ninth Circuit decision, for
example, relied on the conclusion that assisted suicide is part of a person's
"liberty interest." 10 (Few writers seem to ascribe different meanings to the
words "freedom" and "liberty," and no difference is recognized in this
article.") These assertions are often left unsupported, as though the point
7. In Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997) and Vacco v. Quill, 117 S.
Ct. 2293 (1997).
8. See Rita L. Marker, Joseph R. Stanton, Mark E. Recznik, & Keith A. Fournier,
"Euthanasia: A Historical Overview," 2 Md. J Conlemp. Legal Issues 257 (1991).
9. John Adams, Letter to James Warren, 3 February 1777, reprinted in The Works of
John Adams, vol. nine, p. 451 (1854).
10. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 816 (1996), revyd. sub nom.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1977).
II. So, for example, when a work contains statements about the nature of liberty this
article treats them as though they were statements about the nature of freedom unless that
work identifies a distinction between those terms.
"Autonomy" is a related term which some authorities use to identify the value alleged
to be promoted by assisted suicide. See, e.g., Charles Baron, Clyde Bergstresser, Dan W.
Brock, Garrick F. Cole, Nancy S. Dorfman, Judith A. Johnson, Lowell E. Schnipper, James
Vorenberg, & Sidney H. Wanzer, "A Model Statute to Authorize and Regulate Physician-
Assisted Suicide," 33 Harv. J. ofLegis. 1,5 (1996). Autonomy seems to be a different thing
from freedom: autonomy seems to be a condition inforo interno, whereas freedom has much
to do with external conditions. See Gerald Dworkin, The Theory and PracticeofAulonomy,
108 (1 988)("Autonomy is a second-order capacity to reflect critically upon one's first-order
preferences and desires .. "); Richard J. Arneson, "Freedom and Desire," 15 Canadian
J. Phil 425, 433-34 (1 985)("A person is morally autonomous to the extent that she acts only
so as to conform to self-imposed rules .... Autonomy so understood is a possession of a
certain sort of character.... [It] is not the same as freedom construed as a benefit that can
be doled out to a person, consisting in a range of opportunity open to that person."). For
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were obvious. It is, however, far from obvious when one begins to reflect
on the nature of freedom and the various aspects of that condition which
deserve theoretical attention.
In part one of this article, I attempt to establish that assisting in suicide
does not promote the assisted person's (the "subject's") freedom. I try to
shed light on the much vexed problem of defining that good. 12 My aim
is not to uncover truths suitable for use in constitutional law: it is not, for
example, to create a definition of "ordered liberty" or "liberty interest" for
Fourteenth Amendment purposes.
13
Specifically, as to assisted suicide, this article advances four lines of
argument. First, looking to the subject's future, it maintains that assisted
suicide violates the subject's freedom because it puts an end to further
activities and projects. Second, looking to the subject's past, it maintains
that assisted suicide violates the subject's freedom when it violates
commitments he may have made-for example, in marriage. Third, it
presents a detailed argument for the view that the basic purposes embraced
by the person in question are an important guide to determining whether he
does or does not possess his freedom, and that assisted suicide does not
enhance his freedom in those many instances in which it is contrary to what
he has accepted as his basic purposes and fundamental commitments.
Fourth, it acknowledges the importance of criteria beyond those of the
subject's basic purposes, but concludes that application of such criteria do
not lead to the conclusion that assisted suicide enhances freedom.
Left aside are certain related arguments that might persuasively be
advanced against assisted-suicide programs, such as that they impair the
freedom of the subject's friends and family, 14 of doctors, 15 and of other
a detailed treatment of self-control and its relationship to autonomy, see Alfred R. Mele,
Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy (1995).
12. Professor Berlin referred to "the more than two hundred senses, of this protean word"
(freedom). Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, 6 (Inaugural Lecture before the
University of Oxford, October 31, 1958)(hereinafter referred to as Berlin, Two Concepts).
(This work was reprinted in modified form in Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, 118
(1969)). The eminent classicist Professor M.I. Finley stated: "Men have for centuries
exercised their minds in vain to find a workable definition of 'freedom'. I do not propose
to add yet another attempt to the mountain of failures ... ." M. I. Finley, Economy and
Society in Ancient Greece, 77 (198 1).
13. Perhaps, however, some constitutional law scholars and higher court judges would
find it helpful to reflect on the philosophical problems involved in understanding freedom.
Judges seldom do that at present.
14. For citations to studies depicting the devastating effect that suicide may have on
friends and family members, see notes 148-50, infra.
15. For an analysis of how proposed assisted-suicide legislation may mandate coopera-
tion by physicians and health-care institutions, see Scott FitzGibbon & Kwan Kew Lai, "The
Model Physician-Assisted Suicide Act and the Jurisprudence of Death," 20 Hary. J. L. &
Public Policy 127, 139-46 (1996).
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affected persons, 16 or that the freedom that such programs allegedly
promote must be overridden in order to promote respect for life. 17
A broader purpose of part one of this article is to shed some light on the
project of defining freedom. Misunderstandings and misguided lines of
analysis seem to be responsible for many ill-conceived reform measures in
recent decades, not only in the area of suicide.
The analysis will repeatedly refer to Circe's advice to Odysseus, as
follows:
Square in your ship's path are the Seirenes, crying
beauty to bewitch men coasting by;
woe to the innocent who hears that sound!
He will not see his lady nor his children
in joy, crowding around him, home from sea;
the Seirenes will sing his mind away
on their sweet meadow lolling. There are bones
of dead men rotting in a pile beside them
and flayed skins shrivel around the spot. Steer wide;
keep well to seaward; plug your oarsmen's ears
with beeswax kneaded soft .... But if you wish to listen,
let men tie you in the lugger, hand
and foot, back to the mast, lashed to the mast,
so you may hear those harpies' thrilling voices;
shout as you will, begging to be untied,
your crew must only twist more line around you
and keep their stroke up, till the singers fade. is
16. For authorities relating to "copy-cat" suicides, see note 200, infra.
17. For a close analysis and a review of several traditions, see John Kleinig, Valuing Life
(1991). See Evangelium Vitae (Encyclical of Pope John Paul i, March 25, 1995) (discussing
the condemnation of killing in the Christian tradition); Damien Keown & John Keown,
"Killing, Karma and Caring: Euthanasia in Buddhism and Christianity," 21 J. Med. Ethics
265 (1995)(describing the sanctity-of-life objection to killing in the Christian and Buddhist
traditions). For a valuable criticism of euthanasia from a nonconsequentialist point of view,
see John Finnis, "A Philosophical Case Against Euthanasia," in Euthanasia Examined:
Ethical, Clinicaland Legal Perspectives, 23 (John Keown, ed., 1995). See also John Finnis,
"The Fragile Case for Euthanasia: A Reply to John Harris," in Euthanasia Examined, supra,
at 46; John Finnis, "'Misunderstanding the Case Against Euthanasia: Response to Harris' First
Reply," in Euthanasia Examined, supri, at 62. See generally Euthanasia and Clinical
Practice: Trends, Principles and Alternatives:,4 Working Party Report (1982), reprinted
in Euthanasia, Clinical Practice and the Law I (Luke Gormally, ed., 1994)(describing the
Christian and especially the Roman Catholic condemnation of euthanasia).
18. Homer, "The Odyssey," book twelve, pp. 222-23 (Robert Fitzgerald, tr., 1961).
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II. A PRELIMINARY LOOK AT THE DEFINITION OF FREEDOM
A. Freedom Is an Aspect of the Human Condltion.-Freedom is an
aspect of the human condition that involves external circumstances as they
bear upon the subject. To assert that someone possesses freedom is to assert
something about how he stands in relation to conditions around him.
A useful comparison can be made to the term "nourishment." Whether
supplying food to someone nourishes him depends in part on who he is and
how he is situated. (Contrast the verb "to feed," which can be used to
describe events of an entirely objective, foro externo nature, as when film
is "fed" into a projector.' 9) Similarly, whether' someone's freedom is
enhanced by a change in conditions depends on subjective factors. (Contrast
the verb "to free," which can* be used to describe things of an entirely
objective nature: removing an obstruction may "free" a river to flow
smoothly, but it would be odd to talk about the freedom of a river.
20)
B. You Know It When You Have It and Even Ordinary People Can
Possess Freedom.-Freedom is not, in Professor Isaiah Berlin's brilliant
choice of term, an "occult" good or a good of an "occult" entity. 2 1 It can
be a condition of ordinary life. Or at least that is the perception of many
ordinary people who immigrate and emigrate to obtain it and risk their lives
to defend it. Thus it is not, like the condition of mystics or the illuminati,
a condition accessible only to the elect, or to persons in a state of moral or
intellectual perfection.
19. A river can be "fed" (by a stream) but cannot, except by distant analogy, be "given
nourishment" by it. In the case of human beings, to feed someone is usually to enhance his
nourishment, but not always. "To feed" can be understood entirely based on externals, as a
film can be "fed" into a projector; and thus you might be said to be "feeding" someone when
you spoon into his mouth some comestible of which he has already consumed more than he
wants and more than is good for him; something which his system will reject by way of
nausea; something he will refuse to swallow; or even something addictive and poisonous.
You can be said to be "feeding" perhaps, but not "nourishing" him. Feeding usually
nourishes, but not always. (If the English word for nourishment was constructed on the verb
"to feed," as the French word nouritureis related to the verb nourir--if the English word for
nourishment or nourished were "enfeedment" or "fedness"-it would obscure the distinction.
How could you feed someone, we might unreflectingly demand, without augmenting his
fedness?)
20. Sometimes philosophical arguments proceed from "free" to "freedom" without pause
(e.g. in G.A. Cohen, Self-Ownership, Freedom and Equality, 64 (1995), in Cohen, "The
Structure of Proletarian Unfreedom," 12 Philosophy and Public Affairs 3, 26 (1983), and
in J.P. Day, "On Liberty and the Real Will," 45 Philosophy 177, 191 (1970)) on the
assumption, perhaps, that one's freedom is an aggregation of all the things one is free to do,
just as one's aspirations seem to be an aggregation of all the things one aspires to and one's
store of food seems to be the sum of all the food one has acquired.
21. Berlin, Two Concepts, supra. note 12, at 18.
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C. Freedom is an Aspect of the Good.-Freedom is a condition, then;
and obviously it is a desirable condition. It is a good.22 Freedom is the
state of possessing, across time and in general, the good that freeing char-
acteristically (but not always) confers.2 3
This, then, is to reject the position of "restrictivists" who "[v]iew
freedom as primarily a descriptive concept [and who] ... repudiate the
contention that evaluative judgments and moral and political conmitments
must inevitably inform any judgement we make about freedom."2 4 It is
to reject the effort to construct a "non-normative ' 2 5 or "value-free" 26 or
conventionalist 27 account.28  A "value-free" account makes it impossible
to defend social programs on the grounds that they may enhance freedom:
impossible, for example, to defend assisted-suicide programs on that basis.
Thus rejecting such an account stands here as a concession to the advocates
of assisted suicide.
Prominent writers tell us that freedom is "God's most precious gift to
human nature, for by it we are made happy here as men, and happy as gods
in the beyond,"'29 that it is "our unalterable destiny,"30 "an inalienable
22. See generally Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (1986)(rejecting a purely lin-
guistic or usage-based analysis and insisting on an approach based on political theory); John
Gray, "Against Cohen on Proletarian Unfreedom," in Capitalism, 77, 103 (Ellen Frankel
Paul, Fred D. Miller Jr., & John Ahrens, eds., 1989)("The task of a theory of freedom is to
give freedom a definite content by reference to a larger moral and political theory. Most
particularly, it is to specify the liberty that is demanded by justice. The demands of justice
are, further, to be explained in terms of the requirements of the well-being of
individuals . . ").
23. This is true of the parallel with "nourishment": nourishment or being nourished is the
condition that characteristically ensues from having been fed in the right way and on the right
foods. To be nourished is to participate in the good of food.
24. John Gray, "On Negative and Positive Liberty," in ConceptionsofLibertyin Political
Philosophy (Zbigniew Pelczynski & John Gray, eds., 1984), 321, 322.
25. G.A. Cohen, "The Structure of Proletarian Unfreedom," 12 Philosophy and Public
Affairs 3, 10 n.8 (1983).
26. The phrase "value-free" in this context appears in Felix E. Oppenheim, "'Facts' and
'Values' in Politics: Are They Separable? I Political Theory 54, 56 (1973).
27. E.g. Nancy Hirschmann, "Toward a Feminist Theory of Freedom," 24 Political
Theory 46, 52 (1996)("Context is what makes meaning possible, and meaning makes
'reality.' Thus the value that we place on freedom, as well as the meaning we give to that
word, is in no way essential or natural but the product of particular historical relationships
that have developed through time.")(reference omitted).
28. Furthermore, freedom seems not to be of instrumental value only: not something that
could reasonably be dispensed with if only we could serve our "needs" or other ends more
efficiently without it. This, then, is to reject views such as that of Professor von Hayek, who
wrote: "If there were omniscient men, if we could know not only all that affects the
attainment of our present wishes but also our future wants and desires, there would be little
case for liberty." F.A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, 29 (1960).
29. Dante Alighieri, Monarchy, book one, XII (1309-17)(Donald Nicholl, tr., 1947).
To be precise, one should note that Dante is speaking here of "the fundamental principle of
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ingredient in what makes human beings human," 31 something "of which
a human being cannot divest himself or be deprived without temporarily or
permanently ceasing to be human," 32 the source of love, 33 and the
principal subject of both tragedy and comedy. Professors Germain
Grisez and Joseph Boyle conclude that it is unjust to restrict it except in
cases of necessity, Professor Ronald Dworkin urges that "a decent
government must regret" restricting it,35 and Professor Joseph Raz
concludes that the state has a duty to promote it.36  An account of the
nature of freedom is more successful if it can identify a condition which is
a worthy subject of statements like these; if it portrays freedom as the sort
of thing to which people could reasonably set up statues in New York
Harbor and Tiananmen Square.
37
D. The Good to Which Freedom Relates Has to Do with Being the
Author of One's Own Life, with the Development of Character, and
with Moral Responsibility.-So, then, what actually is the good of
freedom?
Perhaps a theorist of freedom can escape the responsibility of expounding
a comprehensive theory of ethics. But an account of freedom must at least
portray a condition that is compatible with relevant aspects of ethics. An
all our liberty," namely "free choice." Dante also states that "the human race is at its best
when most are free." Id.
30. Johann von Schiller, quoted in R.D. Miller, Schiller and the Ideal of Freedom, 21
(1970).
31. Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, ix (I 969)("[T]hose who have ever valued
liberty for its own sake believed that to be free to choose, and not to be chosen for, is an
inalienable ingredient in what makes human beings human . . ").
32. Michael Oakeshott, "A Place of Learning," The Colorado College Studies, No. 12,
p.7 (Jan., 1975).
33. Johann von Schiller, quoted in R.D. Miller, Schiller and the Ideal of Freedom, 21
(1970).
34. R.D. Miller, Schiller and the Ideal of Freedom, 29 (1970)(characterizing the view
of Johann von Schiller).
35. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, 268 (1977).
36. Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom, 425 (1986).
37. Furthermore, freedom is a single good rather than a collection of unrelated
"freedoms" or "liberties." This, then, is to reject the view which seems to be advanced by
Professor Rawls when he states that "[n]o priority is to be assigned to liberty as such, as if
the exercise of something called 'liberty' has a preeminent value" and when he recommends
instead the formulation of a list of liberties (specified at one point as "freedom of thought and
liberty of conscience; the political liberties and freedom of association, as well as the
freedoms specified by the liberty and integrity of the person; and. finally, the rights and
liberties covered by the rule of law"). John Rawls, PoliticalLiberalism, 291 (1993). But see
id. at 295 ("The priority of liberty implies in practice that a basic liberty can be limited or
denied solely for the sake of one or more other basic liberties .... ). See generally H.L.A.
Hart, "Rawls on Liberty and its Priority," 40 U. Chi. L. Rev. 551 (1973), reprinted in
Reading Rawls: CriticalStudies on Rawls -.4 Theory ofJustice',230 (Norman Daniels, ed.,
1989)..
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account of nourishment has to make some contact with its proximate good,
which seems to be that of health, and will go astray if it badly
misunderstands health (misunderstands it to be a form of pleasure, for
example, or physical power). Similarly, an account of freedom ought to
make contact with the aspect of the good condition to which it principally
relates. (Sometimes disagreements-about the requirements of freedom turn
out to be disagreements about other aspects of ethics.)
There seem to be three principal ways in which freedom plays a part in
a satisfactory human life. First, freedom is a component of the good of
doing any reasonable thing and "being a player." It is not enough merely
to think out what might be done and what might be achieved; nor enough
to see those happy outcomes occur, it is the better also actually to do the
things one has settled on as worth doing and see the commendable outcomes
occur as a result of one's own actions. Being in jail, and unable to act,
would be a sorry state because it would deprive you of this opportunity. It
would be a sorry state even if some genie brought about the changes in the
outer world which you would have sought to achieve had you been at
liberty to act. The good life has much to do with doing things; with being
involved in the translation of plans into achievements. Freedom is a
component of the good of human action when it is human in the fullest
sense; when the person is fully involved as the author of his acts.
38
Second, freedom relates to the moral standing of good action. When an
action is a good one: when the objective,foro externo aspects of the action
are commendable, then not only the act but also the person himself-the
actor-may deserve credit. Freedom is a necessary condition for this. Only
when he exercises freedom in acting is he fully the author of the act and
only then does he fully deserve credit for it.39
A third aspect of the good of freedom, widely noticed in the literature,
consists in learning, in self-development, and in self-realization. 40 Doing
good things and participating in good projects is a way to develop one's
knowledge of their goodness. (Thought without action cannot achieve this
fully: you could not know intimately the good of loyalty to a spouse or
children without being married and caring for children.) Doing good things
38. Cf. Gerald Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy, 81, 111 (1988)("what
makes a life ours is that it is shaped by our choices.... * * * The exercise of the capacity
of autonomy is what makes my life mine. "). See generally Christine Swanton, Freedom:
A Coherence Theory (1992), especially at 40-48 (discussing the relationship between
freedom and "flourishing").
39. See Gerald Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy, 110 (1988)("It is
because other persons are creators of their own lives, are shapers of their own values, are
originators of projects and plans, that their interests must be taken into account, their rights
respected, their projects valued.").
40. See John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 88 (1980).
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and participating in good projects is a way of bringing their goodness into
yourself and making it a part of yourself.4 l (A good spouse is something
you become; it is not just the name for a collection of activities.) It is good
to have an excellent character (courageous and kind, wise and appreciative
of the good). It is good to have the version of a good character one has
identified for oneself as the best. But it is better still to have this character
as a result of one's own striving; one's own actions and projects. (Better
than if some genie had conferred your virtues on you.) Freedom is a
component of the life of self-development and self-realization. 42
E. Is Freedom Impaired Only by Human Action; Only by Outright
Prohibitions and not by Mere Burdens; Only by Obstacles and
Impediments and not by Absence of Means?-Some authors take the
view that only impediments imposed by humans impair freedom, not obsta-
cles encountered in nature so that, for example, a hiker who falls into a pit
has not lost his freedom.43  Some take the view that only impediments
imposed by governments impair freedom, 44 or only impediments imposed
41. See John Paul II, Apostolic Exhortation: The Role of the Christian Family in the
Modern World (Familiaris Consortio) (Vatican translation, St. Paul ed., 1982), § 34 at 56
("[M]an, who has been called to live God's wise and loving design in a responsible manner,
is an historical being who day by day builds himself up through his many free decisions; and
so he knows, loves and accomplishes moral good by stages of growth."); John Finnis,
Fundamentals of Ethics, 141 (1983)("[O]ne's free choices... constitute the sort of person
... one has made oneself.")
42. And when one's character is the product of one's own actions the good of deserving
credit for it-for one's good character as well as one's good actions--emerges as another
aspect of the good of freedom. See Germain Grisez, Christian Moral Principles,42, (1983)
vol. one of The Way of the Lord Jesus ("One shapes one's own life, one determines one's
self, by one's free choices. To be responsible ultimately means to be a self one cannot blame
on heredity, environment, or anything else other than one's own free choices.")(footnote
omitted).
The analysis in this subsection is consistent with the assertion in note 28, supra, that
freedom is not only instrumentally a good; it is a component, not only a cause, of the goods
of being the author of an act, deserving the credit, and being self-constituting. Cf
Lawrence Crocker, Positive Liberty: An Essay in Normative Political Philosophy, 114
(1980)("My general strategy in arguing for the intrinsic value of liberty is to show that it is
a non-causal necessary condition of an intrinsically valuable complex and contributes value
to that complex.")
43. E.g. F.A. Hayek, The Constitutionof Liberty, 12-13 (1960)( stating that only coercion
infringes freedom "in our sense" of that word); Berlin, "Two Concepts" in Four Essays in
Liberty, supra note 12, at 121-2 (identifying liberty---"negative liberty"-as "involved in the
answer to the question, 'What is the area within which the subject... is or should be left
to do or be what he wants to do or be, without interferenceby other persons."' (emphasis
added).)
44. E.g. Joel Feinberg, Harm to Others, 7, (1984) vol. one of The Moral Limits of the
Criminal Law.
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in the exercise of discretionary or arbitrary authority.45  Some take the
view that only insur-able impediments count, thus excluding obstacles that
can be overcome. In theories like these, poverty does not infringe
freedom, nor other instances of deprivation of means. 47
Assisted-suicide programs do not enhance freedom under many of these
definitions insofar as they extend means and merely make it easier for the
subject to perform the act. Extending a further concession to the proponents
of assisted-suicide-programs, this article will not rely on this line of
argument.
Ill. THE FIRST ARGUMENT AGAINST THE CASE FOR
PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE: WHAT ABOUT THE FUTURE?
Because freedom is a condition, a reasonable account of it must look
beyond the moment and get a longer perspective on the subject's life. Any
reasonable argument that to act in a certain way promotes freedom must
take into account consequences beyond the immediate.
48
Assisting someone to become a slave would not promote his freedom but
deprive him of it.49 Nor would locking someone up and throwing away
the key (even with his consent). To determine whether we have promoted
someone's freedom, we must consider his future as a whole. Assisting
someone to die would effect an even more severe deprivation than would
enslaving him. Helping him to die puts an end to all his opportunities for
action and to any possibility of his participation in the good of freedom.
50
45. E.g. Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government'
(1997)(advancing a theory of freedom as "non-domination").
46. E.g. Hillel Steiner, "Individual Liberty," 75 Proc. Aristotelian Soc. 33, 44 (1975),
reprinted in Liberty, 123, 134 (David Miller, ed., 1991).
47. E.g. F.A. Hayek; The Constitution of Liberty, 12-19 (1960).
48. See John Kutlgen, Autonomy and Intervention: Parentalism in the Caring Life, 90
(I 995)("What must be respected is the person's aggregate autonomy realized throughout her
lifetime. What must be considered about a paternalistic intervention is its effect, as far as
this can be anticipated, on her future stream of autonomous actions and satisfying
experiences.").
49. See generallyJoel Feinberg, Harm to Self, 71 et seq., (1986) vol. three of The Moral
Limits of the Criminal Law (discussing slavery contracts, and accepting that the law may
rightly refuse to enforce them); David Archard, "Freedom Not to be Free: The Case of the
Slavery Contract in J.S. Mill's On Liberty," 40 Phil. Q. 453 (1990). The recurrent
philosophical puzzle of the "contented slave" is discussed at the test accompanying notes 59-
61, 87-93, and 114, infra.
50. Here and throughout this article the discussion is limited to effects in this life. As
to the next, see The Comedy of Dante Alighieri, Cantica 1, Canto XIII (c. 1314).
The arguments in this section and the next are directed only to the freedom of the person
who uses assistance in suicide and actually kills himself. Perhaps, however, it will be argued
that an assisted-suicide program enhances the freedom of those who do not use it. Certainly
it does seem to be the case that an option may enhance freedom even though it ends up being
left unexercised. This thesis is discussed (and accepted) in the text accompanying notes 109-
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(Untying Odysseus will constrict his freedom rather than promote it if the
result will be his immediate death on the rocky shore. Feeding someone
poison does not nourish him.)
IV. THE SECOND ARGUMENT AGAINST THE CASE FOR
PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE: WHAT ABOUT THE PAST?
A second point looks not forward in time but backward. Any reasonable
theory of freedom must take previous commitments into account. This is
why enforcing contracts usually promotes freedom rather than restricts
it--"freedom of contract." When someone is obliged to honor a contract,
he is held to a course of action he chose for himself; he is led to bring to
completion a project to which he has already set his hand. The same can
be said of obliging someone to honor other voluntary concordances:
relationships of trust, of guardianship, of marriage, of parenting, and of
friendship, for example.
The implications for suicide are obvious: in those many instances where
the subject is married to someone who relies and depends upon him, or has
children, or has obligations to fellow workers or employees, suicide effects
a departure from what the subject has undertaken, and assisting with the
suicide constricts his freedom rather than enhances it.
51
This line of argument becomes the more compelling and the more widely
applicable to the extent that you embrace strongly communitarian doctrines.
(Further, if you--uncharacteristically among present-day thinkers-adhere
to strongly statist or collectivist views you may be led to condemn suicide
as a violation of the obligations of citizenship or class membership.)
Assisted-suicide initiatives are rooted in radical individualism, of the sort
recently manifested by John Powell and Adam Cohen when they advocated
a right to suicide even for parents of small children on the grounds that
"[t]he general rule in American law is that people do not have a duty to care
for others if they do not wish to do so."
52
(Suppose pursuing the Sirens would not result in Odysseus' immediate
death, but that he could survive, reach shore, and linger among them for
many carefree years. Still, we can judge that untying him would infringe
rather than promote his freedom once we consider his freely undertaken
obligations to his shipmates and to Penelope, Telemachus, and the people
of Ithaca.)
117, infra, but the conclusion that assisted-suicide programs enhance the freedom of those
who do not use them is rebutted in the text accompanying notes 115-17.
5 1. Cf. Joel Feinberg, "Voluntary Euthanasia and the Inalienable Right to Life," 7 Phil.
& Pub. Affairs 93, 119 (1978)(noting that while voluntary euthanasia may be defensible,
"[m]ost people in normal circumstances do have a duty not to kill themselves that is derived
from the rights of other people who rely or depend on them").
52. John A. Powell & Adam S. Cohen, "The Right to Die," 10 Issues in L. & Medicine
169, 177 (1994).
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V. THE THIRD ARGUMENT: PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE
USUALLY VIOLATES THE SUBJECT'S BASIC PURPOSES
One debate about the nature of freedom concerns whether that condition
must be defined in part to have a subjective element, or whether instead it
must be defined wholly objectively so that a constraint5 3 would be
recognized as impairing freedom regardless of what the constrained person
might think of the situation and regardless of any other aspect of his
character. This section concludes in favor of a subjective element: his
freedom is impaired by obstacles along his own intended path, not someone
else's. Then this section takes up the question of what aspects of the
subject's mentality count in assessing his freedom, and concludes that the
key is his basic purposes: his more fundamental aims and commitments.
Removing impediments to a course of action enhances freedom, it is
concluded, when the course of action is consistent with the subject's basic
purposes. This conclusion is then applied to the question of suicide, and it
is argued, relying on medical and psychiatric evidence, that suicide is
seldom consistent with a person's basic purposes.
A. The Desire-Based Account of Freedom and its Shortcomings.-
Some formulations make freedom depend in part on the subject's desires or
"wants." This approach was suggested by Professor Isaiah Berlin at the
point in his lecture Two C~oncepts of Liberty where he identified liberty as
"simply the area within which a man can do what he wants."54
But this leads to the dubious conclusion that you can expand your
freedom by constricting your desires or wants.55  Epictetus stated that
"freedom is not acquired by satisfying yourself with what you desire, but by
destroying your desire."56 But putting you in jail infringes your freedom,
it seems, whether you like jail or not.3 Having been thrown in jail, you
53. This section refers recurrently to constraints, impediments, and obstacles, but it is not
intended to overlook lack of means as a possible infringement of freedom. The pattern of
argument here presented would be much the same as to them.
54. Berlin, Two Concepts, supra note 12, at 6-7 ("[p]olitical liberty in this sense is
simply the area within which a man can do what he wants.")(emphasis added). Professor
Berlin also identified liberty ("negative liberty") as "involved in the answer to the question,
'What is the area within which the subject.., is or should be left to do or be what he wants
to do or be, without interference by other persons."' Id. (emphasis added). Professor Berlin
uses the terms "freedom" and "liberty" interchangeably. Id. at 6.
55. This is a dubious conclusion, just as it is dubious that you could increase your
nourishment by constricting your desire for food.
56. Arrian 's Discourses of Epictetus, book four, ch. 1, line 175 (early second century),
in Epictetus, 305 (vol. two of the Loeb Classics edition, W.A. Oldfather, tr., 1925). Other
relevant passages are id., book one, ch. 1, lines 128-31 and book four, ch. i, lines 151-55
in Epictetus, supra, pp. 289, 297.
57. Among the authorities who notice this argument are Bertrand Russell, Sceptical
Essays, 118 (1928); J.P. Day, "On Liberty and the Real Will," 45 Philosophy 177 (1970).
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could not restore your freedom, surely, by inducing yourself to enjoy the
place, or to detest the outside world. (Even contemptus mundi could not
free you, surely, if contemptus mundi is nothing more than what Professor
Berlin called the "sublime . . form of the doctrine of sour grapes." 58)
Still less acceptable is the implication that the oppressive government that
put you in jail could restore your freedom by brainwashing you into liking
your treatment. Similarly unacceptable is the implication that an owner of
a rebellious slave gives him his freedom by breaking his spirit, so that the
more servile he becomes the more freedom he possesses. Jail is jail and
slavery is slavery, and these institutions, it seems, always infringe the
freedom of their victims.59  Recognizing the force of such arguments,
Professor Berlin abandoned the desire-based formula6° and adopted an
objectivist account.
An interesting inversion of the "destroy your desires" argument can be
performed by introducing instances in which desires are expanded rather
than contracted. The more places you long to enter, among those you
cannot penetrate, the less freedom you have according to desire-based
analysis. Thus a society diminishes the freedom of its poorer members
when it allows preserves for the prosperous-such as country clubs,
yachting resorts, prestigious universities-to proliferate. And the freedom
of a society's poorer members will diminish to the extent that they learn of
such preserves and aspire to enter them. (A corollary is that the media
constrict freedom when they create an illusion that many such aspirations
can be achieved and that all such grapes are sweet.)
Desires have a highly fluid quality and therefore afford an unstable basis
for an account of freedom. The desire-based theorist is led to the
embarrassing conclusion that someone's freedom expands and contracts
many times in the course of a day.6 1
58. Berlin, Two Concepts, supra note 12, at 24.
59. A modification of this conclusion for certain unusual circumstances is suggested in
the text at note 88, infra.
60. Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, xxxviii (1969):
In the original version of Two Concepts of Liberty, I speak of liberty as the absence of
obstacles to the fulfillment of a man's desires. This is a common, perhaps the most
common, sense in which the term is used, but it does not represent my position. For
if to be free-negatively-is simply not to be prevented by other persons from doing
whatever one wishes, then one of the ways of attaining such freedom isby extinguishing
one's wishes .... If degrees of freedom were a function of the satisfaction of desires,
I could increase freedom as effectively by eliminating desires as by satisfying them; I
could render men (including myself) free by conditioning them into losing the original
desires which I have desired not to satisfy.
61. And when desire is extinguished by deep sleep, it seems that freedom is maximized.
Perhaps the desire theorist can escape these criticisms by making his theory refer only
to sustained or habitual desires. The person who is constrained from satisfying them lacks
223.
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Another argument notes that the desire-based ap2 roach produces a very
odd result when applied to the que.ition of threats. Assume you are not
the unusual character who likes jail: you normally loathe to be confined, and
therefore imprisonment usually infringes your freedom, even on the desire-
based account. But suppose now you are confined not only by locks but
also by threats: the jailer threatens to shoot you (not mortally) if you try
to leave. This threat, of course, works by exploiting your desires. Once
you hear the threat, you desire to refrain from exiting the jail because of
your aversion to pain. Therefore, according to the desire-based theory,
although you are confined, you have your freedom.63 Indeed, your jailer
has given you your freedom. (If a nasty regime threatened to torture those
who escaped, it would thereby confer freedom on everyone in its prisons.)
A more fundamental objection to the desire-based account is that it makes
it difficult to establish a relationship between freedom and the basic
good.64 Perhaps a utilitarian would see little difficulty here, but adherents
of other schools of ethics will not accept that it is a significant good to be
unhampered in pursuing all desires, however transient and mutually
contradictory. Still less will they understand why someone can be said to
be fully human only if he possesses freedom if that is how freedom is
defined. A desire, after all, may be something that even its possessor does
not approve of or plan to act upon.65 Further, it seems doubtful that the
desire-based account is compatible with the insight, set forth above, that
freedom has much to do with self-constitution-with the development of
character-and with the related insight that freedom supports the subject's
freedom, according to this version, even when he is not experiencing the desire. This move
leaves the theory open to difficulties with respect to people whose desires are entirely
fluctuant. (This may indeed be the condition of slaves in a society where a dominant
ideology half-persuades them to forget about their wishes to act freely, or who drown their
sorrows in drink or drugs.) The theory seems to lead to the improbable conclusion that a
slave with fluctuant desires is free.
62. See generally Steiner, supra note 46.
63. This is most clearly the case where the effect of the threat is to extinguish the desire
to exit the jail. It must be conceded, however, that often this is not the way threats work.
Threats often leave the victim with conflicting desires: the prisoner may experience a fear of
the threatened pain and at the same time a hunger for the forbidden pleasure. How would
a desire-based account of freedom handle cases of conflicting desires? The obvious approach
would be to adopt a criterion based on intensity, and to embrace the doctrine that in cases
of conflict freedom is impaired only by impediments to fulfilling the strongestdesire. But
this approach would leave the account vulnerable to the argument advanced above in the text:
the theorist must conclude that when avoidance of the gun dominates the prisoner's feelings
he has his freedom because jail is an obstacle to the fulfillment only of the weaker desire.
64. As depicted in section 1I B C, supra.
65. Cf Dante Alighieri, Monarchy, book one, X1I (1309-17)(Donald Nicholl, tr.,
1947)("[I]f the judgment is in any way deflected or influenced by the appetite it cannot be
free, because it is not independent but is dragged along captive in the wake of another.").
A parallel argument can be advanced about the definition of "nourishment": it does not
always nourish someone to feed him what he wants.
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worthiness for credit. Having a range of choices 66 among things one
desires-such as is afforded by a dessert tray-may lead to improving one's
sensibilities and refining one's appetites; one may gain more credit among
judges of culinary taste; but those who hold to an ethic other than the
Epicurean will not accept this as a sufficient sort of self-development or as
the most important sort of credit, and will be left looking for a better
account of freedom.
B. The Objectivist Account of Freedom and its Shortcomings.-
Noting the first of the lines of criticism set forth above (illustrated by the
happy prisoner and the contented slave), Professor Berlin revised his
position as follows:
The sense of freedom, in which I use this term, entails not simply the
absence of frustration (which may be obtained by killing desires), but the
absence of obstacles to possible choices and activities-absence of
obstructions on roads along which a man can decide to walk. Such
freedom ultimately depends not on whether I wish to walk at all, or how
far, but on how many doors are open, upon their relative importance in
my life .... 67
A stark and uncompromising version of the objectivist theory is presented
by Hillel Steiner, who develops a test based on "the amount of physical
space and/or material objects the use'of which is blocked." 68
But if I put a wall around a house in Hong Kong I surely infringe your
freedom in no material way; certainly far less than if I put a wall around
your house; and this seems to be explicable only because of you--of your
condition: in other words, explicable based on some subjective element.69
If I prevent you from reading NASA periodicals (lock them away in a
66. The term "choice" in this article refers to one among a plurality of possible courses
of action. The term is not used to refer to the act or process of selection.
67. Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, xxxix (1969). A subjective element seems to
be retained by the phrase "relative importance in my life" and elsewhere--e.g. at page 130
n. 1, where he states that the extent of freedom seems to depend on "what value... the agent
... puts on the various possibilities" open to him.
68. Hillel Steiner, "Individual Liberty," 75 Proc. Aristotelean Soc. 33, 47 (1975),
reprinted in Liberty, 123, 137 (David Miller, ed., 1991).
69. The objectivist might make only a modest concession here, and modify his doctrine
to provide that freedom is infringed by every objective impediment to things the subject
would otherwisehave the abilityto do. (Language in both Berlin and Steiner suggests this.)
Maybe this handles the Hong Kong hypothetical if you could not (easily?) go there. (One
argument against a disability-based definition of freedom proceeds along the same lines as
the argument about the contented prisoner: it seems that jail would no longer infringe the
freedom of a prisoner who became crippled and was therefore unable to leave the scene
anyway. It seems that the evil jailer who cripples him thereby frees him.) But the objection
works just as well in instances which cannot be handled by this modest concession, as the
hypothetical about the NASA publications, next set forth in the text above, establishes.
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government safe), surely I do not materially impair your freedom if you are
not a rocket scientist; not to the extent I would if I prevented you from
studying road maps or reading fiction. Blocking or unblocking a road you
will never travel or a house you will never visit or locking up and unlocking
documents you will never read cannot often have much to do with your
condition or with the good for you and therefore--because, as asserted,
freedom is a basic good and a part of a good condition-cannot
fundamentally determine your freedom. (Blocking and locking up places
and things that are irrelevant to you will not affect what you do or the
development of your character, or your eligibility for moral credit.7) This
line of reasoning establishes that some aspect of your life--perhaps your
plans, purposes, aims and intentions-must be a part of the analysis of what
importantly impairs your freedom.
Furthermore, the objectivist theory seems to run into difficulties, although
these difficulties differ from those encountered in the desire-based theory.
Suppose your jailer leaves the cell door open but stands ready to shoot and
cripple you if you attempt to exit. (You will still escape, probably: he
usually cripples the arms.) You are not physically blocked. But surely
you are not in possession of your freedom. Two paradigmatic cases of
freedom-infringers---dictators and slave-owners-work their will mainly
through threats. So do most laws; the objectivist theory seems to lead to the
conclusion that laws do not impede freedom.
So we are brought to reject unqualified objectivism and to return to the
subject, aiming now to find something about him other than his "wants" or
desires on which to fix.
C. Subjectivism Revisited.--Can we identify an episode in which the
subject does increase his freedom by changes that are, in important part,
subjective?
Imagine a political dissident in China in 1990, hunted by the police for
his part in the Tiananmen Square demonstration. Surely he is not free,
hiding in basements and unable safely to show himself in public. A certain
large and prosperous country with a democratic political system is willing
to accept refugees like him. For some months he is reluctant to surrender
the struggle and leave his homeland. Eventually he changes his mind and
enters the democratic country's embassy, is flown out and given citizenship
because of his status as a political refugee.
Plainly he has increased his freedom. But we cannot explain that based
only on the accounts of freedom considered to this point. Both before and
after his departure, all doors are closed to him in his country of origin;
many doors open to him in the second country. Both before and after his
70. See generally the discussion of the relationship of freedom to the good in section II
D of this article, supra.
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departure, he loves his native country and ardently desires to be there and
do many of the things he is debarred from doing, such as attending its
leading university. Both on the objectivist theory, and on the desire-based
one, it might seem that his freedom is materially impaired both before and
after his trip. (Indeed, it might seem that according to these theories his
flight makes him less free if he would thereafter be denied reentry to his
homeland.)
Let us see whether an account of the subjective side of freedom, different
from the desire-based one, can be constructed to explain his case.
D. Toward a Subjective Element More Fundamental Than Wants
and Desires.-Many of the difficulties with the desire-based account seem
to relate to the transient nature of desires and the fact that they are often
disapproved of even by the subject himself. This suggests the strategy of
looking for something more stable and basic on which to found the account
of freedom. What more fundamental aspect of the subject's character
remains when desire evaporates?
The search for the "true self' has a long and worrisome history in the
philosophy of freedom, characterized with considerable vehemence by
Professor Berlin:
Have not men had the experience of liberating themselves from spiritual
slavery, or slavery to nature, and do they not in the course of it become
aware, on the one hand, of a self which dominates .... identified with
reason, with my 'higher nature', . . . with my 'real', or 'ideal', or
'autonomous' self.., which is then contrasted with... my 'lower'
nature, the pursuit of immediate pleasures, my 'empirical' or
'heteronomous' self[?] . . . . Presently ... the real self may be
conceived as something wider than the individual... : a tribe, a race, a
church, a state ... This entity is then identified as being the 'true' self
which, by imposing its collective, or 'organic', single will upon its
recalcitrant 'members', achieves its own, and, therefore, their, 'higher'
freedom ..... I may declare that they are actually aiming at what in
their benighted state they consciously resist, because there exists within
them an occult entity-their latent rational will, or their 'true'
purpose-and that this entity, although it is belied by all that they overtly
feel and do and say, is their 'real' self, of which the poor empirical self
in space and time may know nothing .... Once I take this view, I am
in a position to ... bully, oppress, torture them in the name, and on
behalf, of their 'real' selves .... 71
71. Two Concepts of Liberty, supra note 12, at 17-18. A good example of what
Professor Berlin condemns can be found in Bernard Bosanquet, The Philosophical Theory of
the State, 117-18 (3d ed., 1920):
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Why not found an account of freedom on the absence of impediments to
the functioning of some "occult self'? Because of fear-surely this
accounts for the gripping power of Professor Berlin's address-fear of the
evil uses to which such theories may be put. Two Concepts of Liberty is in
this respect characteristic of much English-language philosophy of the 1950s
and early 1960s: it recoils from abstraction and "occult" concepts because
of the horror induced by the specters of fascism72 and communism.
It seeks refuge in empiricism. This endeavor can only run into
embarrassment, because there is no entirely "empirical self." Mirroring
much unsuccessful philosophical anthropology from its era, the account runs
first to founding an account of freedom on desires-a sort of empiricism of
the foro interno. Then it turns, as described above, to objectivism. It
develops the narrowness of a dietician who listens only to a behaviorist's
account of health. It loses its involvement with the humanitas of the
subject-the person whose good condition is at issue in all questions of
freedom.
Professor Berlin is surely right to seek to found the account of freedom
on something which is not mysterious. Freedom is, as noted, a condition;
an aspect of the good life; an aspect of the good which can be sought by
ordinary people, fought for by ordinary people, and possessed by people
who live ordinary lives and not the lives of illuminati or inhabitants of some
pinnacle of social development.73 (Freedom ought not to be characterized,
as some modem theologians have done, as something that is possessed or
exercised in its true state only once, at the moment, perhaps unknown even
to the subject, when he exercises his "fundamental option." 74)
[T]he self or life which extends beyond our average private existence.., is more real
than we are ... * * * [L]iberty ... must be a condition relevant to our continued
struggle to assert the control of something... which we recognize as... our real self
.... Thus it is that we can speak, without a contradiction, of being forced to be free.
It is possible for us to acquiesce as human beings, in a law and order which on the
whole makes for the possibility of asserting our true or universal selves, at the very
moment when this law and order is constraining our particular private wills in a way
which we resent, or even condemn.
(Note omitted.)
72. An interesting example, published during the year previous to Two Concepts of
Liberty, is Leonard Krieger, The German Idea of Freedom: History of a Political Tradition
(1957). This work concludes (at page 468) that "From the 16th century to the 20th... the
political history of Germany had been dominated by the successive absorptions of the various
claims to human freedom piecemeal into the structure of monarchical government without
undermining the independent authority of that government."
73. This is true to the comparison to "nourishment," which ought not to be defined as
"that which would contribute to the health of the Higher Man."
74. "The central core of myself, the 'I' which is my personhood, is confronted with a
reality that transcends all categories. It is confronted with the reality of my world, my
situation, my body, my feelings, my attitudes and prejudices. In fact it is confronted even
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To avoid the fictitious and the occult, we need not embrace empiricism.
Instead, it will suffice to stick with common sense. Let us construct an
account of freedom based on the subject's life as he is actually living it; to
his life and thoughts and character as he himself might describe them; to
things as they actually are (supplemented by some reasonable suppositions
about how his life and character might develop in a real, not an idealized,
future).
E. Purposes as an Element in the Definition of Freedom.
1. Purposes and Desires Contrasted Purposes a Better Basis for a
Theory of Freedom than Desires.-We can explain the case of the political
refugee if we dispense with desires and "wants" as the foundation of the
account and instead adopt purposes as a key.75 The refugee's desires may
not have changed as a result of his journey. Perhaps, owing to
homesickness, he desires more than ever to do the things forbidden to him.
But his purposes have changed.
The distinction can be found in the elements of reflecting, assessing, and
judging. You may have a desire without having reflected upon it, or
assessed its merits, or judged it to be appropriate, or determined to let it
guide your actions. The same cannot be said of a purpose. The will and
the deliberative faculties are involved in the project of settling upon a
purpose. The refugee may have had the same desires at the beginning and
the end of the story; but when he decided to flee, and did leave, and entered
upon the project integrating himself into his new country, his purposes
developed and changed. He elected not to be guided by his desires relating
to his native country, and instead chose to pursue projects in his adoptive
one.
This change makes it possible to explain the conclusion that his freedom
has been enhanced. Let us define freedom, subject to further improvements,
as "the absence of impediments to acting in accordance with one's
by the condition of the possibility of that reality: namely, God. And from the perspective
of my own core, the subjectivity that I am, this cosmically inclusive objectivity presents itself
for decision. A simple, singular decision: yes or no. The freedom of the human person,
then, is not categorical freedom at all. Rather, it is a freedom that transcends all categories,
it is 'transcendental freedom."' Timothy E. O'Connell, Principles for a Catholic Morality,
62 (1978), quoted in Germain Grisez, Christian Moral Principles, 383-84, (1983) vol. one
of The Way of the Lord Jesus.
75. Professor Berlin seems to open the door to this line of analysis by stating, in a much-
discussed footnote, "The extent of my freedom seems to depend on (a) how many
possibilities are open to me (and] . . . (c) how important in my plan of life, given my
character and circumstances, these possibilities are." Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of
Liberty," in Four Essays on Liberty, 130 n. 1 (1969). He similarly states, in the introduction
to this work at xxxix, "[s]uch freedom ultimately depends.., on how many doors are open
[and] ... upon their relative importance in my life. . . ." These passages are discussed in
Richard J. Arneson, "Freedom and Desire," 15 Can. J. Phil. 425, 429-30 (1985).
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purposes." As he changed his purposes, his freedom was enhanced. (No
surprising limitations are imported by using the word "purposes"; let that
term be here broadly understood to mean "fixed judgments as to action.")
2. An Account of Freedom Based on Basic Purposes.-Professor Gerald
Dworkin in The Theory and Practice of Autonomy76 uses the story of
Odysseus and the Sirens to resent the question: When a person is of two
minds, which one counts? When his purposes conflict, which one
defines his freedom?
The reasonable approach seems to be to identify a ranking or hierarchy
of purposes, identifying some as more important or basic. Freedom has
mainly to do with the basic purposes, as suggested by Professor Charles
Taylor:
A man who is driven by spite to jeopardize his most important relation-
ships, in spite of himself, as it were, or who is prevented by unreasoning
fear from taking up the career he truly wants, is not really made more
free if one lifts the external obstacles to his venting his spite or acting on
his fear. Or at least he is liberated into a very impoverished freedom. 78
We may thus conclude: Freedom consists in opportunities to act in
accordance with one's purposes; and, preeminently,79 one's basic
purposes.80 Freedom is most importantly enhanced by the availability of
opportunities to pursue basic purposes, and it is materially infringed by
impediments to pursuing such opportunities. When purposes conflict,
frustrating the superficial in furtherance of the basic serves freedom. Tying
Odysseus to the mast promoted his freedom rather than infringed it because
that action served his basic purposes and disserved only superficial ones.
76. At 14-15 and 106 (1988).
77. Professor Dworkin at this point discusseswhich ones apply to determining autonomy;
he makes a distinction between autonomy and liberty: tying up Odysseus infringes his liberty
but not his autonomy. Id. at 106.
78. "What's Wrong with Negative Liberty," in Liberty,41,160 (David Miller, ed., 1991).
79. It would not seem correct to exclude superficial (or intermediate-level) purposes from
consideration altogether; the test proposed in the text excludes them only when they conflict
with basic purposes. The refugee from China may never have altered -his basic purposes
(obtaining prosperity, education, wisdom, love) but only intermediate-level ones (citizenship
here rather than there, pursuing one line of work rather than another, attending this university
rather than that one). His intermediate level purposes remained well integrated with his basic
ones, unlike with Odysseus, and therefore deserve to be counted in determining what adds
to his freedom.
80. Perhaps Professor Berlin embraces this approach when he states, "The extent of my
freedom seems to depend on (a) how many possibilities are open to me (and] ... (c) how
important in my plan of life, given my character and circumstances, these possibilities are."
Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty," in Four Essays on Liberty, 130 n. 1 (1969)
(emphasis added).
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What establishes a purpose as basic? One possibility could be derived
from Professor Harry Frankfurt's important 1971 article, "Freedom of the
Will and the Concept of a Person," in which he introduces the concept of
"second-order volitions." 81 An individual who had only desires would be
a "wanton." He would not, according to Professor Frankfurt, be a person
at all, because personhood requires having "volitions," that is, deter-
minations involving the will. Second-order volitions are volitions about
one's desires. Thus, a drug addict who wills to free himself of his craving
for heroin has a second-order volition: a volition about his own desire."
We might take a cue from this and say-Professor Frankfurt himself comes
close to saying 3-that freedom is defined mainly by second-order
volitions.
This would certainly lead to a reasonable result in the case of the drug
addict: depriving him of drugs seems to enhance his freedom rather than
constrict it because it serves his second-order volition. However, this criter-
ion seems to be a very narrow one in recognizing, as determinative of free-
dom, only what we might call reflexive volitions or purposes: ones which
are about other purposes or desires. But might not a purpose be basic with-
out being reflexive? Odysseus' basic purposes may not include the reflexive
one of not having the desire to go to the Sirens. He may even enjoy those
frustrating feelings. His basic purposes are getting back to Ithaca and so on.
Those are not reflexive, but surely they define his freedom.
Another possibility is suggested by Professor Taylor's article:
We experience our desires and purposes as quantitatively discriminated,
as higher or lower, noble or base, integrated or fragmented, significant or
trivial, good and bad. This means that we experience some of oifr desires
and goals as intrinsically more significant than others .... * * * When
I am convinced that some career, or an expedition to the Andes, or a love
relationship, is of fundamental importance to me... it cannot be just
because of the throbs, elan, or tremors I feel; I must also have some
sense that these are of great significance for me, meet important, long-.
lasting needs, represent a fulfillment of something central to me, will
bring me closer to what I really am, or something of the sort.8
This analysis is distorted in an experiential direction: pursuit of a vocation,
surely, is a basic purpose for the subject not just because he "experiences"
it as basic. It seems that whether a purpose is basic depends on its position
in relation to other purposes,85 not on how one feels about it.
81. 68 J. Phil. 5, 10.
82. The material in the Frankfurt article referred to up to this point is in id. at 10-12.
83. Id. at 15, 17.
84. "What's Wrong with Negative Liberty,.' in Liberty, 141, 152 (David Miller, ed.,
1991).
85. As some of the language in Professor Taylor's article suggests.
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The better approach seems to be one which looks to the subject's
judgments of relative importance. A test along these lines has been
suggested by Professor Arneson, who states, "a desire for something is basic
if that thing is desired for its own sake, not as a means to some further
end."46 This is an excessively exclusive test of what is basic: it counts only
final ends. A purpose may be relatively basic for a subject even if he does
not think like a philosopher and is agnostic as to its finality. A purpose
may be relatively basic for a subject even if he accords some further
purpose a yet more fundamental status in his thinking. Reunion with
Penelope and taking his place in the political order of Ithaca were basic
purposes for Odysseus, even though those may have been instrumental to
the goods of friendship and justice. A purpose is basic, as defined in this
article, if the subject has ranked it as dominant in his plan of life, and as
worthy to govern in instances of conflicts with other purposes.8
7
An account of freedom founded on basic purposes improves the analysis
of the cases of the happy prisoner and the contented slave. A person may
perhaps "destroy his desire" or be brainwashed or have his spirit broken in
such a way as no longer to experience a longing to escape. But even after
such psychic changes most people would retain longer-term commitments,
so that, were they released and given an opportunity for quiet reflection,
they would take up the threads of their lives again, and return to their
families and their jobs. They would, in other words, abandon their
artificially altered affective state as a guide to action and embrace once more
the pursuit of their basic purposes. For people like these-almost everyone,
in other words-jail is jail and slavery is slavery and freedom is served by
escape and release. (On the other hand, the analysis to this point allows the
conclusion that a prisoner or slave might obtain freedom by embracing new
basic purposes. If someone sold into slavery were to undergo a spiritual
conversion and decided to devote his life to ministering to fellow slaves, the
analysis to this point leads to the conclusion-not an implausible one-that
he has his freedom.88)
86. Richard J. Arneson, "Freedom and Desire," 15 Canadian J. Phil. 425, 435 (1985).
Another approach suggested by Professor Arneson is based on a distinction between "vital
options" and "inert options." "[A]n option is vital for a person to the extent that its very
availability will bring it about that the person acquires an increased basic desire either for
having the option or exercising it or both." Id. at 437. This would seem to make an option
important to the extent it excites the appetites.
87. Can it be damagingly objected that whenever purposesconflict, the basic purpose will
be the one the subject chooses to act upon, since by choosing that way he manifests what he
identifies to be basic? Common sense suggests that this is not how temptation affects people.
Common sense insists that even while he longs for the Sirens' shore, Odysseus' plans for
returning to Ithaca are still "there" in his character, and retain a basic voice in his
deliberations, though one that has been temporarily drowned out.
88. See section VI D of this article, infra, for further discussion of this issue.
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An account of freedom along these lines solves the problem about threats
that was found to be mishandled by the desire-based (and by the objectivist)
accounts.8 9 The threat to hurt the prisoner if he escapes may change his
desires but not his basic purposes, which continue to be frustrated by prison.
This account of freedom is compatible with the account set forth above
of freedom as a part of the good. 90  Freedom is good because only the
free man can "be a player," be the author of his life; freedom protects, in
other words, the relationship between what the man thinks, on the one hand,
and action, on the other. Purposes-not desires or impulses, but fixed
fundamental intentions--establish this relationship. Freedom is also good
because only the free man deserves full credit for meritorious actions; here
again, purposes are a key element; people fully deserve praise and reward
only for the things they do on purpose. Freedom is also good because it
makes it possible to develop character; only the free man is the author of his
own character. And it seems that it is planned, deliberate, purposive action
that allows us most to participate in the good of the things we aim at.
91
The "basic purposes" account implies that someone cannot possess
freedom in a full way unless he has a reasonably well developed array of
basic purposes. (Only someone "who has a well-considered path of life
mapped out before him" is free according to Cicero.92) This account
would add another element to the analysis of the happy prisoner and the
contented slave: if they are happy and contented because they have
abandoned not only their normal desires but all their basic purposes they
could not be said to possess freedom. Contentment though purposive
lobotomy does not enhance freedom. 93
89. See text at notes 62-63 and towards the end of section V B, supra.
90. In section 11 C and D, supra.
91. Cf John Finnis, Fundamentals of Ethics, 139 (1 983)("AlI free choices... change
the person .... The more strategic or architectonic the choice of X, the greater the degree
of commitment and the more substantial the lasting of that choice.").
92. Cicero, Paradoxa Stoicorum Paradox V, 284, 285 (Loeb Classic Series No. 349, H.
Rackham, tr., 1942)("For what is freedom? The power to live as you will. Who then lives
as he wills except one who follows the things that are right, who delights in his duty, who
has a well-considered path of life mapped out before him ... ?").
93. Further, it seems that someone does not possess freedom fully unless he has an array
of purposes which he embraces and develops in the normal and optimal way: that is, through
the exercise of balanced and mature judgment.
A further development of the theory would unpack some of the implications of the
phrase "in accordance with" in the proposition "Freedom consists in opportunities to act in
accordance with basic purposes." John Stuart Mill indicates that the state does not
impermissibly infringe freedom when it impedes access to a bridge which will collapse under
traffic. If a course of action cannot further the subject's basic purposes, then obstructing it
seems not to infringe freedom even when the subject, owing to ignorance, seeks to follow
that course.
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F. What All This Tells Us About Assisted-Suicide Programs.-The
above analysis has no surprising or restrictive implications for most
government policies. Opening the door to the prison cell, freeing the slave,
allowing exit for the political dissident-the things that seem on first glance
to enhance freedom generally do indeed enhance it in most cases.
But assisted-suicide programs are distinguishable, because they involve
permitting or facilitating not any of a range of options (as freeing a prisoner
or a slave permits a wide variety of projects) but one specific sort of act.
It is an act unique in all of human experience, and because freedom is a
human condition that cannot be understood without involvement in the
humanitas of the subject, it calls for a unique and careful analysis. Suicide
turns out to have special features in the subjectivity of those who commit
or contemplate it, as here set forth.
Persons who commit or contemplate suicide are seldom guided by their
basic purposes.94 Some of them are in the grip of depression or other
severe psychological distress.95 Even those that are not are seldom guided
by their basic purposes. Professor Edwin Shneidman, in his recent book
The Suicidal Mind,96 describes a phenomenon he calls "constriction,"
captured in the image of "the diaphragm of a camera closing down on the
tightest focus":
In suicide, the diaphragm of the mind narrows and focuses on the single
goal of escape to the exclusion of all else-parents, spouse, children.
Those other persons in the life are not forgotten: they are simply not




There is . . . one . . . aspect of mental life and behavior that is
characteristic of the suicidal state of mind. It is called constriction, and
refers to a narrowing or tunneling of the focus of attention. It comes out
m .. in the use of certain words .... * * * The single most dangerous
word in all of suicidology is the four-letter word only---as in this brief
excerpt from the words of a young woman who jumped from a high
place and just luckily survived.
94. Cf Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Autonomy and Self Respect, 99-101 (1991)(arguing that
principles of rationality and autonomy are violated by impulsive, apathetic, or self-abasing
acts of suicide).
95. Professional literature discussing this is cited and described at notes 104-108 & 125-
31 and accompanying text, infra.
96. (1995).
97. Id. at 60. See id. at 134 ("A person who commits suicide turns off all ties to the
past, declares a kind of mental bankruptcy, and his or her memories have no lien.").
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I was so desperate. I felt, my God, I can't face this thing. Everything
was like a terrible whirlpool of confusion. And I thought to myself,
there's only one thing to do. I just have to lose consciousness. That's
the only way to get away from it. And the only way to lose
consciousness, I thought, was to jump off something good and high. * *
* And then I got to the fifth floor and everything just got very dark all
of a sudden, and all I could see was this balcony. Everything around it
just blacked out. It was just like a circle. That was all I could see. Just
the balcony. And I climbed over it and just let go.98
A similar account is given by the English writer A. Alvarez, who himself
attempted suicide: "Once a man decides to take his own life he enters a
shut-off, impregnable but wholly convincing world where every detail fits
and every incident reinforces his decision."9 And by Boris Pasternak,
who wrote of the suicides of young poets persecuted by the Stalinist regime:
Having arrived at the thought of suicide, one abandons all hope, one turns
away from one's past, one declares oneself a bankrupt and one's
memories as nonexistent. These memories are no longer capable of
reaching the would-be suicide to save him, to sustain him. The
continuity of one's inner existence is destroyed, the personality has ceased
to exist. In the end, perhaps, one kills oneself not out of loyalty to the
decision one has made, but because one can no longer endure the agony
that does not seem to belong to anyone in particular, the suffering in the
absence of a sufferer, the empty suspense which is not filled up by a life
that still goes on. 100
Another common thread is the overwhelming of the self: "I am powerless
over my emotions. . . . I'm like a helpless 12 year old. 1 01 "The
rejections, fears and frustrations overwhelm me. There is no way to pull
myself out of this hell."' 10 2 "The bad mood had taken over. I described
it then as a monster that was bigger than I was. I was tired, very tired, and
I gave in to it."' 0
3
And what about suicidal medical patients: people, in other words, in the
position of many likely subjects of physician-assisted suicide? The medical
literature reveals that important causes of suicidal acts and desires among
patients include "impulsivity, . . . subtle cognitive impairments,"4
98. Id. at 59.
99. A. Alvarez, The Savage God: A Study of Suicide, 121 (1972).
100. I Remember: Sketch for an Autobiography, 89 (David Magarshack, tr., 1958).
101. Shneidman, supra note 96, at 14.
102. Id. at 15.
103. Id. at 75.
104. Susan D. Block & J. Andrew Billings, "Patient Requests for Euthanasia and Assisted
Suicide in Terminal Illness: The Role of the Psychiatrist," 36 Psychosomatics 445, 449
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aggressive tendencies, "a wish not to be here for a time (impulse
control),' 01 5  "preexisting substance abuse disorders,"1 6 and
"depression and impaired decision-making capacity."' 0 7  No firm
application of basic purposes is usually involved. Consider the testimony
of a leading hospice physician: "In my experience patients who request
euthanasia almost invariably change their minds.
''lOA
G. Conclusion.-Suicides and attempted suicides are Odysseus released
from the mast. They are seldom instances of action in pursuit of basic
purposes. There may be exceptions, as discussed in Section VII below, but
those who propose new social programs must not rely too heavily on
exceptional cases.
Suicides and attempted suicides are not instances of the exercise of
freedom when freedom is properly understood using basic purposes as the
(1 995)(noting that "[n]onpsychiatrist physicians frequently fail to recognize, diagnose, and
appropriately treat these disorders"). The authors also state:
In a more extreme form, self-reliance, perfectionism, self-control, rigidity, and the
tendency to be judgmental may be conceptualized as part of a narcissistic or obsessive-
compulsive personality disorder. In our experience, these are the most common
personality configurations seen in patients whose physical, psychosocial, and spiritual
problems are well managed and who persistently seek hastened death.
Id. at 450.
105. Alan Apter, Doron Gothelf, Israel Orbach,Ronit Weizman, Gidon Ratzoni, Dov Har-
Even, & Sam Tyano, "Correlation of Suicidal and Violent Behavior in Different Diagnostic
Categories in Hospitalized Adolescent Patients," 34 J. Am. Acad. ChildAdolescentPsychiatry
912 (1995).
106. Block & Billings, supra note 104, at 459.
107. Id. at 45 1. Furthermore, some suicidal persons mischaracterize to themselves what
suicide actually entails, acting pursuant to "a wish not to be here for a time" (Apter,
Gothelf, Orbach, Weizman, Ratzoni, Har-Even, & Tyano, supra note 105) or interpreting
"death as reunion, death as rebirth" (Herbert Hendin, "Psychodynamics of Suicide, with
Particular Reference to the Young," 148 Am. J. Psychiatry 1150, 1152 (1992)).
Earlier authorities finding that suicidal patients generally are under the influence of
abnormal mental states are described in Robert G. Twycross, "Where there is hope there is
life: a view from the hospice," in Euthanasia Examined: Ethical, Clinical and Legal
Perspectives, 141, 145-46 (John Keown, ed., 1995).
Most of these distorted mental states are not of the sort that would cause a patient to be
screened out by the standard sort of competence requirement contained in assisted-suicide
initiatives. See New York State Task Force on Life and the Law, "When Death is Sought:
Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in the Medical Context - Supplement to Report" (April,
1997)("Many individuals who contemplate suicide-including those who are terminally
ill-suffer from treatable mental disorders, most commonly clinical depression. Yet,
physicians routinely fail to diagnose and treat these disorders, particularly among patients at
the end of life. As such, if assisted suicide is legalized, many requests based on mental illness
are likely to be granted, even though they do not reflect a competent, settled decision to
die.").
108. Twycross, supra note 107, at 155.
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criterion. Professor Shneidman advises, "never commit suicide while you
are suicidal"; 109 to which we can now add, "it does not enhance a
person's freedom to assist him to commit suicide while he is suicidal."
VI. BEYOND BASIC PURPOSES
"Opportunities to serve basic purposes" is not a sufficiently demanding
account of freedom. This section introduces further criteria and then applies
them to assisted suicide.
A. Why "Opportunities to Serve Basic Purposes" Cannot Suffice:
Freedom Involves a Range of Opportunities.-Suppose a person whose
future is determined within precise confines, but suppose those confines
conform precisely to his basic purposes. Some telepathic Guardian discerns
his thinking and decrees his destiny in considerable detail, fixing his fate so
that, for example, only one college and one graduate school will accept him
(but the one he wants to attend or the one which best conforms to his aims);
one young lady will take an interest in marrying him, one employer hire
him, and so on.' 10 Basic purposes seem to be served, but at the same
time his freedom seems not to be complete. This indicates that freedom in
a full sense is absent when a person has no more than one option, however
suitable. Full freedom requires a range of options."I I
Full freedom, therefore, requires options not optimally compatible with
basic purposes; and it requires the presence of options not all of which,
obviously, will end up being exercised. (This line of thought is much
emphasized by Professor Joseph Raz in his book The Morality of
Freedom. 12) Freedom involves a journey through life not down a single
path but along a many paths which are continually branching out before the
subject. Exercising freedom involves the play of the mind across the range
of choices.
This conclusion is suggested by the ways freedom is related to the good.
Freedom, it was concluded above, 113 is a component of the good of
action and the good of self-constitution. Now, the subject with the Guardian
is to some extent the author of his acts, his projects and his life, in that the
Guardian uses the subject's basic purposes as a guide in constructing his
destiny. But he is not the author in so full a sense as he would have been
without the Guardian. His involvement in his own life is less than normal.
This is so in two ways. First, without the Guardian he would have been
presented with opportunities he would actually end up taking: opportunities
109. Shneidman, supra note 96.
110. Contemporaneously; as basic purposes change so do the Guardian's decrees.
I 11. This point is made in Joseph Raz, The Moralityof Freedom (1986) at many points
including pages 398 and 425 (in connection with autonomy).
112. (1986).
113. In Section 11 C and D.
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outside his basic purposes but which once encountered would lead him to
rethink those purposes. Second, without the Guardian he would have been
presented with opportunities that he would not take, but which would help
in his deliberations. For most people, pursuing a project involves not only
framing basic purposes, but also clarifying them as life presents new
opportunities, discerning methods of pursuing purposes, crafting techniques,
struggling to persevere as tempting alternatives beckon, reexamining
commitments as difficulties arise, and doing all these things across time as
information develops more fully. To dispense with such aspects of life by
falling under the control of the Guardian is to dispense with much of what
is character-forming in life and much of what earns people credit for how
they live.
So, a range of choices is required; what should such a range consist of?
Consider now another guardian-call him a Guardian of Freedom, and not
just of basic purposes. This guardian is eager to offer the subject whatever
promotes freedom. What sort of options does this Guardian afford the
subject?
Faithful to the understanding of freedom as a condition, the answer must
identify choices which will form a part of the subject's life. Here is the key
to what the Guardian of Freedom affords. He affords opportunities which
are within the subject's deliberative scope.
B. Freedom Involves Opportunities Related to "Extended
Purposes."--One obvious category of such opportunities is that category
with opportunities near the subject's purposes. Full freedom requires the
presence of opportunities penumbral to the subject's purposes. If he aims
to go to law school and become a litigator, he needs also, to be more fully
free, to be presented with the opportunity to go to law school and become
a corporate lawyer, or to go to a school of government and become a civil
servant. (Whereas it may have little bearing on his freedom whether or not
some minor league baseball club will or will not recruit him.) His mind
will range across opportunities closely related to his basic purposes and his
character will form in contemplating them. The Guardian of Freedom
would be inclined to offer an opportunity to the subject if the Guardian
could conclude, "this option will give someone who thinks like the subject
something to ponder."
A corollary is the wider the purposes of the subject, the broader the
penumbra. The more "open ended" the purposes of the subject-the more
fluid and protean they are-the wider the penumbra. Odysseus requires a
wider range of choices than does the Cyclops.
Furthermore, the better the subject pursues the goods of freedom, the
wider the penumbra. The more use the subject makes of opportunities
within his deliberative scope: the more he actually deliberates about each
opportunity, using it to develop his practical reason and beliefs about the
good, and the more capaciously he does this, attending to uncongenial and
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unconventional possibilities as they present themselves-the wider the
penumbra that will enhance his freedom. Contrariwise, someone who is in
a pathological condition of estrangement from his own acts and thoughts,
as brilliantly portrayed in Sylvia Plath's book The Bell Jar, or who attempts
with some degree of success to "put off his actions like soiled clothing,"
attempting to live as though he were not the person who committed them,
fails to participate fully in the good of freedom. Extending further
opportunities to a person in that condition may not foster his freedom in any
full sense, rather as offering food to someone whose digestive system will
reject it owing to illness does not nourish him.
C. Freedom Involves Opportunities Related to Natural or
"Appropriate and Reasonable" Purposes.-Suppose the Sirens had so far
affected Odysseus as to cause him not only to forget his longer-term
purposes but also to expunge them from even the subconscious areas of his
mind. Could we nevertheless conclude that tying him to the mast enhances
his freedom? Not on the account presented to this point; but on a
reasonable extension of it, here proposed. Heading a household, raising a
son, ruling a city were reasonable possibilities for Odysseus whether he held
to such purposes or not, and therefore holding those opportunities open to
him seems to enhance his freedom.
This suggests the concept of "natural purposes" or, to use a phrase with
a modem flavor, "appropriate and reasonable purposes." (The Supreme
Court sometimes uses language like that in expounding on the nature and
extent of fundamental liberties.) Freedom in the full sense includes
opportunities to pursue projects that, though not focused on by the subject
or penumbral to those that have been, could if they presented themselves to
the subject attract his serious consideration by reason of their compatibility
with his abilities and his social and economic conditions. On this ground
the intending lawyer's freedom may be significantly infringed when he is
forbidden to join even a political organization he at present disagrees with,
or to serve in the military in time of national peril, or to pursue a religious
vocation he as yet has no inclination to take up.
Introducing this element effects an important departure, because it
introduces a "non-positive" element: it demands the presence of options
based on criteria which have not been "posited" ("put there") by the subject.
It demands the presence of options based in part on directions and goals
which are attributed to the subject whether or not he has given any thought
to anything related. The Guardian of Freedom would ask, "Would this
opportunity, if I presented it to him, give him something worthwhile to think
about?" Worthwhile in that if he thought it over he would participate in the
goods of freedom as he did so.
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D. These Extensions Shed Further Light on the Cases of the Happy
Slave and the Contented Prisoner.-From the preceding, it might be
concluded that a prisoner or slave is lacking in freedom even if he has
adjusted his basic purposes-for example, as discussed above, 114 by
determining to pursue ends consistent with his condition. If an intelligent
prisoner reorients his basic purposes so as to devote himself compulsively
to the cleanliness of corridors, he can readily be described as lacking
freedom because lacking opportunities to fulfill purposes that would be
reasonable and appropriate for him. (But if a devout prisoner reorients his
life to prayer and the service of the other inmates, refraining from even
considering another way of life for himself, and if his doing this is
"reasonable and appropriate," then perhaps he is a free prisoner.)
E. How Extensive a Range of Opportunities Beyond Basic Purposes?
Which Opportunities Within That Range?-When it comes to basic
purposes, it seems that every material impediment impairs freedom. When
it comes to opportunities penumbral to basic purposes, and opportunities that
relate to natural or reasonable purposes which have not been embraced by
the subject, it seems that a more moderate requirement is appropriate.
People can be entirely in possession of their freedom, it seems, without
possessing the full range of opportunities of these collateral sorts.
The Guardian of Freedom would ask in each case whether an opportunity
would, if presented to the subject, serve one of the goods of freedom. The
Guardian of Freedom is like a law professor considering whether to advance
a hypothetical: he will do it if it will sharpen the subject's understanding
either.in the course of eliciting a negative or a positive answer.
The Guardian would not advance opportunities otherwise. A few various
and thought-provoking alternatives are enough to make the subject the true
author of what he does, to set him on the path of character-development,
and to entitle him to credit for what he selects. The good of standing up to
the attack of a German tank unit is achieved when the volunteer acts coolly
and not under the baton of a sergeant, and he possesses that good in its
fullness under those circumstances. He need not be offered three different
directions in which to run away, or various opportunities to effect a quick
transfer to a staff position.
F. Does All This Require Us to Revise our Conclusions About
Assisted-Suicide Programs?-So, then, would the Guardian of Freedom
offer the opportunity to commit suicide?
That opportunity would not be within the penumbra of basic purposes for
the normal case of the person who was in no way contemplating it. Further,
it would not be within the penumbra for the person who was near the brink
114. In the text at note 88, supra.
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and afflicted by the "constriction" identified by Professor Shneidmantt 5
or by conditions such as impulsiveness and depression and impaired
decision-making. capacity reported in the medical literature on suicide. 11
6
These conditions involve loss of touch with basic purposes (call this
"vertical constriction") and a loss of vitality in regards to those purposes
(call this "horizontal constriction"). They involve a contraction of the
deliberative scope; a loss of that inquiring, vigorous, protean, Odysseus-like
quality which most fully demands freedom be enhanced by way of
penumbral alternatives. Giving an option to a person in this state of mind
is unlikely to help him in his deliberations and so serve the good of
freedom.
Further, it will rarely-probably never--be possible to say that it is
consistent with his natural purposes or his appropriate and reasonable ends.
And like the soldier whose freedom to be brave is adequately served without
his being afforded multiple ways of running away, a person's freedom to
"affirm life" is served by the possibility almost everyone has of committing
suicide without physician assistance or of disaffirming life and avoiding its
goods in various ways short of self-assassination.
VII. WHAT ABOUT THE SPECIAL CASE OF THE SUICIDAL
PERSON WHO IS NOT "CONSTRICTED" AND IS ACTING ON HIS
BASIC PURPOSES?
The arguments advanced in sections V and VI should suffice to establish
that assisted- suicide programs do not enhance freedom in the large range
of cases in which the mentality of the potential suicide is as described by
Professor Shniedman and other professional investigators. But are there
cases which escape this analysis? Would you enhance such a person's
freedom by handing him the gun or the rope?
What is the mentality of someone who approaches suicide "with his eyes
wide open" and in full possession of his analytic faculties? Leo Tolstoy is
an example:
[Flive years ago something very strange began to happen to me. At first
I began having moments of bewilderment, when my life would come to
a halt, as if I did not know how to live or what to do; I would lose my
presence of mind and fall into a state of depression ..... Whenever my
life came to a halt, the question would arise: Why? And what next? * *
* And like points concentrated into one spot, these questions without
answers came together to form a single black stain.
It happened with me as it happens with everyone who contracts a fatal
internal disease. At first there were the insignificant symptoms of an
ailment, which the patient ignores; then these symptoms recur more and
115. See note 96, supra.
i 16. See notes 96-98, supra, and related text.
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more frequently, until they merge into one continuous duration of suffer-
ing. The suffering increases, and before he can turn around the patient
discovers what he already knew: the thing he had taken for a mere indis-
position is in fact the most important thing on earth to him, is in fact
death.
This is exactly what happened to me. I realized that... if the same
questions should continue to recur, I would have to answer them. And
I tried to answer them. .. But as soon as I laid my hands on them and
tried to resolve them, I was immediately convinced, first of all, that they
were not childish and foolish questions but the most vital and profound
questions in life, and, secondly, that no matter how much I pondered
them there was no way I could resolve them. Before I could be occupied
with my Samara estate, with the education of my son, or with the writing
of my books, I had to know why I was doing these things. * * *
My life came to a stop. I could breathe, eat, drink, and sleep
.... [b]ut there was no life in me because I had no desires whose
satisfaction I would have found reasonable. If I wanted something, I
knew beforehand that it did not matter whether or not I got it.
If a fairy had come and offered to fulfill my every wish, I would not
have known what to wish for.... I knew that it was all a delusion, that
I really desired nothing. I did not even want to discover truth anymore
because I had guessed what it was. The truth was that life is
meaningless. * * *
I grew sick of life; some irresistible force was leading me to somehow
get rid of it. It was not that I wanted to kill myself. The force that was
leading me away from life was more powerful, more absolute, more all-
encompassing than any desire. With all my strength I struggled to get
away from life. The thought of suicide.. . was such a temptation that
I had to use cunning against myself in order not to go through with it too
hastily.... And there I was... carrying a rope from my room, where
I was alone every night as I undressed, so that I would not hang myself
from the beam between the closets. And I quit going hunting with a gun,
so that I would not be too easily tempted to rid myself of life.' 17
Tolstoy's condition was not one like that of Odysseus before the Sirens,
whose desires for a time might have risen up and overwhelmed his basic
purposes; nor like those patients described by Professor Shneidman, whose
basic purposes were occluded owing to the phenomenon of constriction. It
is therefore impossible to use the analysis advanced above relating to
"constriction" and similar mentalities.
On the other hand, it is impossible to conclude that by handing him the
rope one would further his basic purposes and therefore his freedom. His
structure of basic purposes had collapsed entirely, owing to his inability to
117. Leo Tolstoy, Confession, 26-28 (I 884)(David Patterson, trans., 1983).
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believe that there was anything in life worth aiming at. A similar
phenomenon is described by Mr. Castro Reyes, whose brilliant sketch of his
own suicidal mentality is described by Professor Shneidman:
I had done all I could and was still sinking. I sat many hours seeking
answers and all there was a silent wind and no answers. The answer was
clear. Die. I didn't sleep. The dreams were reality and reality dreams.
My will to survive and succeed had been crshed and defeated. I was
like a general alone on a battlefield being encroached upon by my enemy
and its hordes: Fear, hate, self-depreciation, desolation. I felt I had to
have the upper hand, to control my destiny, so I sought to die rather than
surrender.... Death swallowed me long before I pulled the trigger. I
was locked within myself.... There comes a time when all things cease
to shine, when the rays of hope are lost. I placed the gun to my
head. t"
In instances like these the structure of basic purposes has collapsed. The
mentality is not precisely one of constriction: that is, inability to focus on
a range of purposes. Rather, it is the maiming of the aspect of the
personality which leads a person to embrace any purpose.
Could it be otherwise? Could there be a remaining category of cases, in
which the subject attends "with his eyes open" and in which his basic
purposes do not collapse but lead in a coherent way to suicide as their end
and goal? The answer to this question obviously depends on the truth about
anthropology, and not all readers will agree. But the correct view in the
opinion of this author is that this is a most improbable development. The
human purposive system has a certain natural aspect to it just as the
digestive system does; and like the digestive system it can collapse or
malfunction or cease to function, but it cannot reconstitute itself into an
orderly structure for the poisoning or assassination of the subject. It resists
such a function: that seems to be what effects the collapse. In Tolstoy's
words: "[A]s convinced as my reason might have been, this was not
enough. All of these arguments [establishing the "vanity of life"] could not
persuade me to follow my thinking to its logical end, that is, to kill
myself."'19
The purposive structure can collapse; the collapse leaves what Tolstoy
called a "void"; into the void rushes what he called a "force," which impels
a person toward death and which is experienced as alien to that person. We
cannot extend the account of freedom to encompass cooperation with that.
That dark force is something that really might be called "occult."
I 18. Shneidman, supra note 96, at 12-13. "Castro Reyes " is a pseudonym assigned by
Professor Shneidman. Id. at 12.
119. Tolstoy, supra note 117, at 55.
244 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF JURISPRUDENCE (1997)
PART TWO: UTILITY
Initiatives promoting assisted suicide are often defended on utilitarian
grounds-typically the classic, pleasures-and-pains act utilitarianism of
Bentham and Mill.' 2 ° In this form, utilitarianism is
[t]he creed which accepts as the foundation of morals "utility" or the
"greatest happiness principle." [It] holds that actions are right in propor-
tion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the
reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure and the absence
of pain; by unhappiness, pain and the privation of pleasure.' 21
A cognate conclusion is that the value of a person's life rests on his capacity
for enjoyment and for conferring pleasure.
Let us ask those who advance this justification eight hard questions:1. Will Potential Suicides Perform the Utilitarian Calculus?-The
utilitarian argument must rest on the view that assisted suicide increases
utility. This conclusion must rest on the prediction that persons considering
suicide will perform the utilitarian calculus, accurately computing the
consequences and relying on the outcome of the computation to determine
whether or not to act.
Would they do that? The familiar assumption, by writers in the utilitarian
tradition, that humans are "economic" persons who aim (skillfully) to
maximize their utility122 is indefensible in general, 23  and especially
"120. Some elements of utilitarian thinking may be evident in the frequent judicial
references to pain as a consideration in favor of a permissive policy towards assisted suicide.
E.g. in Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997)(Justice O'Connor, concurring)("Avoiding
intolerable pain and the indignity of living one's final days incapacitated and in agony is
certainly '[a]t the heart of [the] liberty ... to define one's own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.' Casey, 505 U.S., at 851.").
The discussion of the utilitarianism argument in this article is adapted, with a few
revisions, from Scot FitzGibbon & Kwan Kew Lai, "The Model Physician-Assisted Suicide
Act and the Juriprudence of Death," 20 Hary. J. L. & Pub. Pot. 127 (1996), reprinted in 13
Issues in L. & Medicine 173 (1997).
121. John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, 18 (Samuel Gorovitz, ed., 1971.)(1863).
122. See Amartya K. Sen, On Ethics and Economics, 80 (1987)("In the usual economic
literature a person is seen as maximizing his utility function, which determines all his
choices."); George J. Stigler, "Economics or Ethics?" in 2 TannerLectureson Human Values
143, 190 (Stanley M. McMurrin, ed., 1981)("[W]e live in a world of reasonable well-
informed people acting intelligently in pursuit of their self-interests."). For a general
discussion of these issues, see Charlie D. Broad, "Egoism as a Theory of Human Motives,"
in Problems of Moral Philosophy, 11 1-18 (Paul W. Taylor, ed., 1978).
123. It is not supported by conclusive empirical evidence. See Sen, supra note 122, at 18.
It is rejected by prominent ethicists and economists. See Amartya K. Sen, "The Formulation
of Rational Choice," 84 Am. Ec. Rev. 385, 386 (1994)("A divergence between choice and
well-being can easily arise when behavior is influenced by some motivation other than the
pursuit of one's own interest or welfare.").
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hard to support in the instance of people contemplating suicide. The
medical literature establishes what common sense would in any event
suggest: many people contemplating self-destruction are in no way thinking
like some Enlightenment philosophe.1
24
Pain would not determine their decisions. At least that is the implication
of a recent major study: "The results suggest that having pain does not
predispose a person to desire or take actions to end his or her life. ' t 25
"Patients experiencing pain were not inclined to euthanasia or physician-
assisted suicide." 
12 6
Instead, important causes of suicidal acts and desires include
"impulsivity, . . . subtle cognitive impairments[,]' 127  aggressive
tendencies, "a wish not to be here for a time (impulse control)"'' 8  and
"preexisting substance abuse disorders."' 129  Another factor is a self-
destructive state of mind:
Self-destructive patients with borderline personality disorder may also
seek physician-assisted death. Self-destructive patients may be uncon-
sciously seeking a physician to hurt or abuse them to confirm their views
of themselves as damaged and unworthy. These patients often have
significant associated depression and impaired decision-making
capacity. 130
124. See generally Shneidman, supra note 96, passim. This work is discussed supra in
the text accompanying notes 96 and 115.
125. Ezekiel Emanuel, Diane L. Fairclough, Elisabeth R. Daniels, & Brian R. Clarridge,
"Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide: Attitudes and Experiences of Oncology Pati-
ents, Oncologists and the Public," 347 Lancet 1805, 1809 (1996).
126. Id. (further stating that "[t]his finding is consistent with data from the Netherlands
demonstrating that pain was the only reason for euthanasia in just 10% of cases and a
contributing factor in fewer than 50% of cases. It is also consistent with data from American
physicians who had carried out euthanasia."(references omitted)). This article also states that
"[p]atients in pain were significantly more likely to find euthanasia and physician-assisted
suicide unacceptable" (p. 1807) and that "those who had pain ... were not more likely to
have discussed euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide or to have read Final Exit"(p. 1808).
127. Block & Billings, supra note 104, at 449 (noting that "[n]onpsychiatrist physicians
frequently fail to recognize, diagnose, and appropriately treat these disorders"). The authors
also state:
In a more extreme form, self-reliance, perfectionism, self-control, rigidity, and the
tendency to be judgmental may be conceptualized as part of a narcissistic or obsessive-
compulsive personality disorder. In our experience, these are the most common
personality configurations seen in patients whose physical, psychosocial, and spiritual
problems are well managed and who persistently seek hastened death.
Id. at 450.
128. Apter, Gothelf, Orbach, Weizman, Ratzoni, Har-Even, & Tyano, supra note 105.
129. Block & Billings, supra note 104, at 459.
130. Id. at 451.
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"Rage, hopelessness, despair, and guilt are important affective states in
which young patients commit suicide." 131  Young people may assign
unusual "conscious (cognitive) and unconscious meanings" to death, such
as "death as reunion, death as rebirth, death as retaliatory abandonment,
death as revenge, and death as self-punishment or atonement." 132
2. Could Anyone Apply the Utilitarian Calculus Successfully to the
Question of Suicide?-To work the utilitarian calculus, the person
considering suicide would have to foresee the experiences that would be
endured if he lived and compare them to those involved in self-inflicted
death.
He would have to predict his pain and its possible palliation. 133  A
recent article reveals:
Undertreatment of pain is common, attributable to deficiencies in health
professionals' education about pain management as well as concerns
about addiction among patients, family members, and clinicians... . In
the Netherlands, an estimated 85% of patients withdraw their requests for
hastened death after receiving better symptom palliation. More than 90%
of patients with cancer pain respond to simple analgesic measures.t 34
A leading hospice physician reports: "In my experience, patients who
request euthanasia almost invariably change their minds. The reason for this
varies. Often, it relates to good palliative care ...."135
To work the utilitarian calculus, the person considering suicide would
have to predict pain's consequences for personality development, not always
foreseeable and not always deleterious:
What is the nature of [the] patient's suffering such that death is preferable
to loss of control and loss of an intact self? Exploration of these
questions often identifies and highlights personality characteristics such
as self-reliance, perfectionism, self-control, rigidity, and the tendency to
respond judgmentally. These defensive styles may have been highly
adaptive in many spheres of life. However, in the setting of terminal
illness, self-reliance may be expressed as difficulty in trusting others,
accepting help, and being dependent; perfectionism as frustration with
personal weakness and neediness; self-control as intolerance of the
noncontrollable vicissitudes and uncertainties of illness; and the tendency
131. Hendin, supra note 107, at 1152 (1992).
132. Id.
133. See Twycross, supra note 107, at 147 ("No patient should be forced to request
euthanasia because of unrelieved pain or other distressing syptoms such as vomiting or
shortness of breath. Methods exist to control such symptoms, either completely or to a great
extent."). This article contains a detailed discussion of the success of medical efforts to
alleviate pain and discomfort at pages 147-51.
134. Block & Billings, supra note 104, at 447.
135. Twycross, supra note 107, at 155.
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to be judgmental as self-criticism and self-blame over being ill and
incapacitated. Giving up control, accepting dependency, and tolerating
physical deterioration may be so intolerable that hastening death becomes
a way to preserve the self. * * * Psychiatric intervention may help such
patients reframe their experience; alternate expressions of control and of
living up to high personal standards of behavior include forebearance in
the face of uncertainty and difficulty, the capacity to model grace in
confronting impending annihilation, and receiving help as a means of
permitting others to master their feelings of loss.
136
Afflictions may lead to fundamental personality developments and even to
a reconstruction of the character in which "the parts of the person are
assembled in a new manner."'137 The sufferer may come to terms with
his affliction by "transcendence"-"the sufferer is not isolated by pain but
is brought closer to a transpersonal source of meaning and to the human
community that shares that meaning." 138 Beforehand, can he assess what
that will be like?
139
He would have to appraise self-inflicted death, an experience which may
be neither quick nor comfortable. Nearly a quarter of patients "who receive
life-ending medication linger for several hours to four days before death
occurs. ' l 0 Death by taking pills, for example, can last three hours or
more. 141 "A patient can spill the medicine or choke or vomit or fall




And then there is the experience of death itself. Not yet having
encountered it, none of us is well positioned to predict what it will be like
when we meet what Henry James called, when he saw it approach, the
Distinguished Thing.
143
Many critics of utilitarianism doubt the possibility of performing the
utilitarian comparison where alternatives involve incommensurable
136. Id.
137. Eric J. Cassell, The Nature of Suffering and the Goals of Medicine, 44 (1991).
138. Id. at 45.
139. See Baruch A. Brody, Life and Death Decision Making, 235-36 (1988).
140. See Courtney S. Campbell, Jan Hare & Pam Matthews, "Conflicts of Conscience:
Hospice and Assisted Suicide," 25 Hastings CenterRep., May-June 1995, at 36, 41 (reporting
that in both the Netherlands and the United States "20 to 25 percent of patients" suffer such
lingering deaths).
141. See Marlise Simons, "Dutch Doctors lo Tighten Rules on Mercy Killings," N.Y.
Times, September Ii, 1995, at A3.
142. Id. (quoting a physician who practices euthanasia in the Netherlands as saying,
"This creates a lot more tension, also among others who accompany the patient. There are
risks because people are terribly sick.")
143. "So here it is at last, the distinguished thing!" quotedin Edith Wharton, A Backiward
Glance, 367 (1934).
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outcomes. 144 The outcomes at issue here-pain; natural death; suicide-
involve qualitative difference as extreme as can well be imagined.
3. Are Pleasures and Pains Really the Proper Guides When Life is at
Stake?-Many critics have noted as a defect of utilitarianism that it leads,
in many circumstances, to an unacceptable willingness to sacrifice human
life.
It leads to the conclusion, in certain instances, that killing the innocent is
justified. For example, it leads to the conclusion-Philippa Foot's
example-that it would be a good thing to induce cancer in someone as a
part of a research project that would eventually alleviate much suffer-
ing;145 and to the view that an innocent victim must be executed when
the populace believes he is guilty and will riot if he is freed. It leads to
these conclusions because human life has no independent weight in the
system; no value other than as a bearer of pleasures and pains. In this
respect utilitarianism contradicts universal common sense; most of us cling
to our own lives even in adversity and stoutly condemn homicide whatever
pleasure it may confer. To kill is to act against important goods unknown
to utilitarianism.
To commit suicide is to act against important spiritual goods unknown to
utilitarianism. "About 50% of patients have a significant change in attitude
and world view in the last 3 months of life, moving from a desire for acute
intervention and the postponement of death towards acceptance, and psycho-
logical and spiritual peace."146 An act of suicide would "mean that many
people will be denying themselves this crucial time when half of them are
likely to have major shifts in their emotional and spiritual attitudes." 147
4. What about the Effects on Other Individuals such as Family Members?
-Radical individualism is a besetting fault of many assisted-suicide initia-
tives. Of course, the effects on friends 148 and family members 149 -
144. E.g. John Finnis, Fundamentals of Ethics 86 et seq. (1983); John Finnis, Moral
Absolutes, 17-24 (1991); John Finnis, Joseph Boyle, & Germain Grisez, NuclearDeterrence,
Morality and Realism, 238-72 (1987); John Finnis, Natural Law and NaturalRights, 111-18
(1979); Germain Grisez, "Against Consequentialism," 23 Am. J Jurisprudence21 (1978).
145. See Philippa Foot, "Utilitarianism and the Virtues," in Consequentialism and its
Critics, 224, 237 (Samuel Scheffler, ed., 1988).
146. Twycross, supra note 107, at 153 (discussing AIDS patients in London).
147. Id., quoting R. George, "Euthanasia: The AIDS Dimension" in Death Without Dig-
nity (N.M. de S. Cameron, ed.)(discussing euthanasia and not assisted suicide at this point).
148. Friends may experience "major depression [and] post-traumatic stress disorder."
David A. Brent, Joshua Perper, Grace Moritz, Chris AlIman, Joy Schweers, Claudia Roth,
Lisa Balach, Rebecca Canobbio & Laura Liotus, "Psychiatric Sequalae to the Loss of an
Adolescent Peer to Suicide," 32 J. Am. Acad. Child Adolesc. Psychiatry 509 (1993).
149. See Daniel Hassenfeld, Call of the Shofar (1995)(presenting a sensitive and
perceptive description of the effects of the death of a close relative); B.J. Smith, A.M.
Mitchell, A.A. Bruno & R.E. Constantino, "Exploring Widows' Experiences After the Suicide
of Their Spouse," 33 J. Psychosocial Nursing & Mental Health Services 10 (1995).
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minor children, for example50-may also be dramatic and long
lasting. 151
The pains of grief are not the half of it. Far more telling are the effects
on the relationship itself, which in a sense continues after death, since, as
Proust said, "a sort of cutting taken from one person and grafted on the
heart of another continues to carry on its existence, even when the person
from whom it had been detached has perished."' 52  What interpreta-
tion-surely often a devastating one-may a wife or a child put on the
blotted signature at the bottom of the page of their love?
And here again pleasures and pains cannot be the only concerns. Other
relevant considerations include ones of obligation: of the marriage oath; of
the natural duty to support minor children; of the ties of friendship.
5. What About Consequences for the Relations Between the Patient and
the Physician? 153 -Many physicians have expressed concern that
discussion of physician-assisted suicide may undermine patient
confidence.1 54 Fifty-three percent of oncologists "thought that discussions
150. See J.A. Grossman, D.C. Clark, D. Gross, L. Halstead & J. Pennington, "Child
Bereavement After Paternal Suicide," 8 J. Child& AdolescentPsychiatric Nursing 5 (1995),
abstract available on Medline.
151. See generally Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 827 (9th Cir.
1996)("The state clearly has a legitimate interest in safeguarding the interests of innocent
third parties such as minor children and other family members dependent on persons who
wish to commit suicide."), rev'd. sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 1.17 S. Ct. 2258
(1997).
152. 2 Marcel Proust, Remembrance of Things Past, 750 (1913-26)(C. K. Scott
Moncrieff, trans., 1932).
153. A similar question can be raised about the relationship between patients and their
families and friends:
[Tihe absolute fixed tabu against suicide... has served to make the patient's right to
expect the care of her family or community fixed and unquestioned. As long as a
human being's natural life exists the family and/or institutional caretakers are morally
obligated to offer support and care. * * * When the option or choice to end a life is
morally permitted, then the interpersonal situation changes. One must justify his or her
choice to go on living and ask why one should voluntarily continue to exact care or be
dependent on others.
Sidney Callahan, "A Feminist Case Against Self-Determined Dying in Assisted Suicide and
Euthanasia," I Stud. In Prolife Feminism 303, 313 (1995).
154. See, e.g., Leon R. Kass, "Neither for Love nor Money: Why Doctors MustNot Kill,"
Public Interest, Winter, 1989, at 25, 35 ("The patient's trust in the doctor's wholehearted
devotion to the patient's best interests will be hard to sustain once doctors are licensed to
kill."); Orentlichter, "From the Office of the General Counsel: Physician Participation in
Assisted Suicide," 262 JAMA 1844, 1844-45 (1989):
If the physician appears sympathetic to the patient's interest in suicide, it may convey
the impression that the physician feels assisted suicide is a desirable alternative. Such
an impression may not be very comforting to the patient. Moreover, if the patient
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between patients and physicians on 'end-of-life care that included explicit
mention of euthanasia or-physician-assisted suicide' would reduce patients'
trust in the physician."
155
This should be a special concern to those who reject the liberal view of
medicine-the highly individualistic one which awards a central place to
rights--and instead accept a "relational" account. Dr. Cassell urges
physicians:
[R]each out to the suffering person to bring him or her back with the rest
of us. You must communicate to the person that no matter what happens
or how difficult it is, you are going to be there and help. * * * Social
contacts must be facilitated. Relationships within the family should be
bolstered. Barriers to familial closeness erected during serious illness by,
for example, untruths, false optimism, repugnance, and fear can usually
be removed with little effort by teaching members of the family how to
interact with a sick person. 156
The case for this "relational" approach is especially compelling in instances
of the terminally ill who begin to discuss suicide:
The vast majority of terminally ill patients who consider or discuss sui-
cide do not kill themselves. For terminally ill patients, as for their non-
terminally ill counterparts, talk of suicide is a signal to physicians and
family that the patient's fears and needs have not. been adequately
addressed. Therefore, the first task for physicians . . . is to elicit the
patient's concerns and try to relieve them.... Most terminally ill patients
find reasons to continue to live after their concerns or symptoms are
assuaged. 1
57
decides to reject suicide, will the patient have the same degree of confidence in the
physician's commitment to his or her care as previously? In short, assisted suicide
might seriously undermine an essential element of the physician-patient relationship, the
patient's trust that the physician is wholeheartedly devoted to caring for the patient's
health.,
(Reference omitted).
155. Emanuel, supra note 125, at 1808. Smaller percentages of patients and the general
public thought that such discussions would have that effect. Id. "19.0% of patients and
26.5% of the general public thought they would change physicians if their physician told
them he or she 'had provided euthanasia or assisted suicide for other patients."' Id.
156. Cassell, supra note 137, at 246-47.
157. Ann Alpers & Bernard Lo, "Physician-Assisted Suicide in Oregon: A Bold
Experiment," 274 JAMA 483, 484 (1995)(references omitted). Cf. Council on Scientific
Affairs, American Medical Association, "Council Report: Good Care of the Dying Patient,"
275 JAMA 474, 475 (1 996)("many persons initiate a discussion about suicide to evaluate the
degree to which others are concerned with their well-being and to evaluate their own self-
worth."). See generally Shneidman, supra note 96, passim.
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But these wise suggestions might not be universally taken after the
institution of physician-assisted suicide programs. Two palliative care
specialists recently expressed the apprehension that if euthanasia and assisted
suicide were to become legal, some physicians might come to hope for their
patients to die:
An appropriate response of health care professionals [to a patient's
request for euthanasia] is to listen carefully to patients' feelings of despair
and to embark with them on. a shared journey of exploration about
meaning, all the while reinforcing that, as people, they are of value no
matter how frail and ill. Skilled physical care must always be provided.
* * * Can physicians continue to strive to better the lot of seriously ill
and dying patients when a possible option is to act on their request to
bring about death? At what point in care would death become a more
attractive option to both parties?
Physicians and health care delivery systems face increased pressure to
practise more efficiently and expediently and more cost-effectively. It is
doubtful that physicians could continue to care for seriously ill patients
who are not likely to survive without developing a bias toward their
patients' earlier death. '58
6. What About Further Consequences to the Medical
Professions?-Further consequences could be extensive. Studies suggest
that a great many patients would request assisted suicide,t 5 9 and that a
sizeable percentage of physicians would receive such requests. 16° At
158. Elizabeth J. Latimer & James McGregor, "Euthanasia, Physician-Assisted Suicide
and the Ethical Care of Dying Patients," 151 Canadian Med. Assoc. J. 1133, 1134-35
(I994)(emphasis added). For evidence of defects in physician communications with patients
and in physician responsiveness to patient wishes in end-of-life situations, see Block &
Billings, supra note 104, at 453; David Orentlichter, "From the Office of the General
Counsel: The Illusion of Patient Choice in End-of-Life Decisions," 267 JAMA 2101, 2102
(1992)(noting that patients "who seemmore intelligent and better educated receive more time
and more explanations from their physicians").
159. See notes 197-99, infra, and accompanying text.
160. See Anthony L. Back, Jeffery I. Wallace, Helene E. Starks & Robert A. Perlman,
"Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in Washington State: Patient Requests and
Physician Responses," 275 JAMA 919, 923 (1996)("Among our responding physicians, 26%
had received an explicit request [for physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia] at some point
in the past, and 13% had received an explicit request in the past year."); Emanuel, supra
note 125, at 1808 ("More than 50% of oncologists [studied] had received requests for
euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide."). Cf David Asch, "The Role of Critical Care
Nurses in Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide," 334 New Eng. J. Med. 1374, 1375 (1996)(17%
of critical care nurses reported receiving requests to engage in euthanasia or to assist in
suicide). Asch's study is criticized in Colleen Scanlon, "Euthanasia, and Nursing
Practice-Right Question, Wrong Answer," 334 New Eng. .. Med. 1401 (1996).
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issue is nothing less than a fundamental reorientation of the ethics of the
health care professions. 1
61
A physician who assisted in suicide would violate the Hippocratic Oath,
in which the physician pledges: "I will neither give a deadly drug to
anybody if asked for it, nor will I make a suggestion to this effect.' ' 162
Regrettably, many graduating medical students these days are not asked to
take the Hippocratic Oath. However, medical authorities continue to
condemn assisting in suicide.' 63  The AMA's Code of Medical Ethics
states that "[p]hysician assisted suicide is fundamentally incompatible with
the physician's role as healer." 164 A leading treatise on medical ethics
states that a right to physician-assisted suicide
has almost never been recognized in law or in codes of medical ethics.
The traditional belief is that we should altogether prohibit such forms of
assistance in health care while authorizing letting die in a certain range
of cases. Standards of health care ethics from the time of the Hippocratic
oath to the present strictly prohibit direct assistance in death, even if a
patient has good reasons for wanting to die. For example, in 1991, the
American Geriatrics Society opposed all physician involvement in killing
or assistance in suicide. In an influential statement passed in 1973 and
161. Cf Miles J. Edwards & Susan W. Tolle, "Disconnecting a Ventilator at the Request
of a Patient Who Knows He Will Then Die: The Doctor's Anguish," 117 Annals Internal
Medicine 254, 256 (1992):
[W]e were struck by the gravity of what we had done. Doubts kept creeping into our
minds. We each experienced a wave of disquieting emotion, feelings that we had killed
this patient .... This anguish continued in both of us for several days. One of us
sought counsel from a psychiatrist who reinforced our belief that we did the right thing.
162. Ludwig Edelstein, The Hippocratic Oath: Text, Translation and Interpretation, 3
(1943). See also Hippocrates, "Oath," reprintedin I Hippocrates299 (W.H.S. Jones trans.,
1923)("Neither will I administer a poison to anybody when asked to do so, nor will I suggest
such a course.").
163. E.g. Tom L. Beauchamp & James F. Childress, PrinciplesofBiomedicalEthics 226-
27 (4th ed., 1994); Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association,
"Decisions Near the End of Life," 267 JAMA 2229 (1992); Public Policy Committee,
American Geriatrics Society, "Voluntary Active Euthanasia," 39 J Am. Geriatrics Soc. 826
(1991). See "US Doctors Reaffirm Opposition to Euthanasia," British Med. J., July 6, 1996,
at 11. In October, 1996, the Congress of Delegates of the American Academy of Family
Physicians reaffirmed its opposition to the legalization of euthanasia and assisted suicide.
Thomas J. Gates, "Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide: A Family Practice Perspective," 55 Am.
Fam. Physician 2437 (1997). See also Latimer & McGregor, supra note 158, at 1135
(noting that experts in palliative medicine conclude that "assistance or counseling in suicide
is not a supportable pattern of medical practice and cannot be considered as part of palliative
care."); Orentlichter, supra note 154, at 1845.
164. Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association, Code of
Medical Ethics § 2.211 (1994)(further noting that the practice "would be difficult or
impossible to control, and would pose serious societal risks").
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revised in 1988 and 1991, the American Medical Association Council on
Ethical and Judicial Affairs allowed forgoing life-sustaining treatments
but prohibited any "intentional termination of the life of one human being
by another-mercy killing." Whether letting particular patients die is
morally acceptable depends on several factors in this policy, but if the
deaths involve killing--even in circumstances identical to those in which
a patient is allowed to die-they are never justifiable.165
Nursing ethics are equally decisive:
The American Nurses Association ... believes that the nurse should not
participate in assisted suicide. Such an act is in violation of the Code for
Nurses . . . .and the ethical traditions of the profession. * * * The
profession of nursing is built upon the Hippocratic tradition "do no harm"
and an ethic of moral opposition to killing another human being. * * *
Nursing has a social contract with society that is based on trust and
therefore patients must be able to trust.that nurses will not actively take
human life. 1
66
A similar tradition guides the hospice movement, which was founded speci-
fically because of objection to euthanasia and in an effort to provide an
alternative to it. The National Hospice Association has stated that eutha-
nasia and assisted suicide violate "all aspects of medical ethics."
167
Medical ethics may already be in a somewhat fluid state owing to the
advent of managed care and changes in the law relating to withdrawal of life
support. 168 Medical academics at Hebrew University in Jerusalem, in a
recent analysis of American practice, conclude that:
-- "[d]uring the last few years, [American] physicians have become more
concerned with societal needs than with their individual patient
needs"; 1
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165. Beauchamp & Childress, supra note 163, at 226-27.
166. American Nurses Association, Position Statement on AssistedSuicide, 1, 3 (1994).
167. Campbell, Hare & Matthews, supra note 140, at 38 (quoting the National Hospice
Organization).
168. See Steven H. Miles, "Physician-Assisted Suicide and the Profession's
Gyrocompass," Hastings Ctr. Rep., May-June 1995, at 17, 18-19 (1995):
A shift in the professional ethic about medical killing from a substantive conclusion
against physician-assisted suicide or voluntary active euthanasia to one of nonjudg-
mental process, consent, and bureaucratic contracts signals a fundamental change in the
moral boundaries and relationships between healers, patients, and society. Meanwhile,
the United States is restructuring the clinician-patient relationship into new . ..
configurations within powerful institutions in which clinicians are accountable for the
health of both individuals and of populations on a finite budget.... The tide is running
too fast to recalibrate this gyrocompass ....
169. Charles L. Sprung, Leonid A. Eidelman & Reuven Pizov, "Changes in Forgoing
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-it has become much more common in recent years for American
physicians to withhold or withdraw treatment in critical-care units;
170
and
-"[u]p to 79% of deaths in the ICU have been shown to occur after the
forgoing of life-prolonging therapies. Treatments such as CPR, which
initially were mandatory in all patients in the ICU, have become optional
and have ultimately become unavailable for some patients."'17 1
Medical ethics would be further changed by physician-assisted suicide
measures and, in many cases, supplanted by statutes and regulations. This
should be objectionable to physicians and other health care workers because
it means further legal colonization of their professions. It should be
objectionable to anyone who believes that the historical traditions of the
healing professions are a reliable guide to the practices consistent with good
medical care. It will be objectionable to many: fifty-two percent of
Michigan physicians in a recent survey said they would not participate in
physician-assisted suicide even if it were legal. 1
2
Because it would be objectionable to many, it might result in a
fragmentation of the medical profession. Fragmentation over this issue is
already afflicting the profession of hospice workers in Oregon:
[The Oregon Death with Dignity Act] permits providers and institutions
to opt out of participation in the law. Yet to many hospice caregivers
this provision for dissent and conscientious objection appears to permit
abandonment of a patient. Thus, an important policy and practical
question for the hospice community. . . concerns whether fidelity and
nonabandonment of the hospice patient requires some level of
participation by the hospice.
.... [D]ifferences emerged not only among hospice programs, but also
within them, with some caregivers expressing fervent opposition to
participation and other hospice staff equally adamant in support of
Life-Sustaining Treatments in the United States: Concern for the Future," 71 Mayo Clinic
Proc. 512, 513 (1996)("Health-care reform has emphasized cost containment ....
[Physicians] have been told not to do everything that is in the best interests of their patients
but rather to do as much as is reasonable.")(references omitted). See alto John M. Luce,
"The Changing Physician-Patient Relationship in Critical Care Medicine Under Health Care
Reform," 150 Am. J. Respir. Crit. Care Med. 266 (1994)(urging physicians to embrace a
communitarian ethic).
170. Sprung, Eidelman & Pizov, supra note 169, at 513. For similar observations, not
specifically about critical care units, see Orentlichter supra note 158, at 2103.
171. Sprung, Eidelman & Pizov, supra note 169, at 513.
172. Jerald G. Backman, Kirsten H. Alcser, David J. Doukas, Richard L. Lichtenstein,
Amy D. Coming & Howard Brody, "Attitudes of Michigan Physicians and the Public Toward
Legalizing Physician-Assisted Suicide and Voluntary Euthanasia," 334 New Eng. I Med.
303, 306 (1996).
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participation. Thus, the moral fallout [of the Act] . . . involved a
collapse of the shared value framework that has guided hospice for the
last two decades.
S. .. At the very least, every hospice will undergo some internal
discomfort and, at the worst, complete upheaval and long-lasting injuries
. . [mhe nature and mission of the Hospice in Oregon will be
irreversibly altered.
173
The unity of a profession depends on its members' acceptance of common
purposes and principles. When basic divergences develop over fundamental
and recurrent matters, the profession stands to lose its coherence. The crisis
among hospices in Oregon could engulf all the healing professions.
These alterations could only be expected to grow deeper during the
months and years after the adoption of an assisted-suicide provision.
Some people profess contempt for slippery-slope arguments,' 4 but there
is nothing foolish about fear of a slope when powerful ideological
groups-internationally organized under the umbrella of the World
Federation of Right-to-Die Societies' 75 -are standing nearby waiting to
give you a push. Here in the United States, suicide-assistance legislation
has been proposed in many states in recent years. 17 6  Were such a
provision to be enacted, efforts to broaden it would follow soon after.
Some such efforts might succeed through challenges to the
constitutionality of legal restrictions. A state has a well recognized interest
in "the protection and preservation of human life," 17 7 but once it has
vitiated that protection in an important way the state may find it hard to
defend "technical" limitations against assertions of irrationality, arbitrariness,
discrimination, vagueness, and infringement on the right to privacy. 178  It
may become difficult to defend a competence requirement against challenges
brought "on behalf of" incompetent patients who "seek" death by proxy
consent. Thus it might become legally permissible (even under certain
circumstances legally mandatory 179) to terminate the lives of the mentally
173. See Campbell, Hare & Matthews, supra note 140, at 40, 43 (1995).
174. For a recent defense of slippery-slope arguments and citations to authorities for and
against them, see Yale Kamisar, "Against Assisted Suicide-Even a Very Limited Form," 72
U Det. MercyL. Rev. 735, 749-53 (1995).
175. See Marker, supra note 8.
176. See note 3, supra, for citations to some of the recent bills.
177. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 282 (1990)( "[W]e think a
State may properly decline to make judgments about the 'quality' of life that a particular
individual may enjoy, and simply assert an unqualified interest in the preservation of human
life to be weighed against the constitutionally protected interests of the individual.').
178. See generally Kamisar, supra note 174, at 749-53; Yale Kamisar, "Are Laws Against
Assisted Suicide Unconstitutional?," 23 Hastings Cir. Rep., May-June 1993, at 32 (1993).
179. See Scott FitzGibbon & Kwan Kew Lai, "The Model Physician-Assisted Suicide Act
and the Jurisprudence of Death," 20 Harv. J. L. &' Public Policy 127, 139-46 (1996),.
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ill and those of other incapacitated persons.18 0
It may become difficult to defend the requirements which assure that the
actual killing will be done by the patient rather than the physician.
Proponents of assisted suicide will argue, as some have already argued in
the New England Journal of Medicine,' a-that such requirements are
unfair to patients who are physically unable to commit suicide. Thus it may
become legally permissible, and perhaps in some circumstances even
mandatory, to commit euthanasia. A leading treatise on medical ethics
states that "[i]t seems likely that assisted suicide will be the driving force
behind efforts to alter rules against killing in medicine."18 2  A similar
strategy is being pursued in Germany, where the German Society for
Humane Dying takes the view that legalizing assisted suicide is a necessary
step towards legalizing euthanasia. 
1 8
reprinted in 13 Issues in L. & Med. 173 (I 997)(describing how certain proposed legislation
might mandate cooperation in assisted suicide).
180. See In re Guardianship of Grant, 109 Wash. 2d 545, 747 P.2d 445 (1987), amended,
757 P.2d 534 (1988); In the Matter of the Welfare of Colyer, 99 Wash.2d 114, 660 P.2d
738 (1983). These cases extend a right to refuse treatment to instances where the refusal is
made by a second party "on behalf of' an incapacitated person.
181. See Christopher J. Ryan & Miranda Kaye, "Sounding Board: Euthanasia in
Australia-The Northern Territory Rights of the Terminally Ill Act," 334 New Eng. J. Med.
326, 327 (1996):
The ethical distinction, if any, between physician-assisted suicide and voluntary
euthanasia has been debated extensively. Allowing voluntary euthanasia means that in
many cases it will be easier to administer substances intravenously and thus improve the
reliability of absorption, the rapidity of death, and the ability to titrate the dose to obtain
the effect. Disallowing euthanasia would make physician-assisted death unavailable to
patients who are competent to request assistance but physically unable to administer the
necessary substances themselves.
(References omitted.)
182. Beauchamp & Childress, supra note 163, at 227.
183. See Margaret Battin, The Least Worst Death: Essays on Bioethics and the End of
Life, 257-58 (1994). And in China, See Peicheng Hu, "The Acceptability of Active
Euthanasia in China," 12 Med. & L. 47, 50-52 (1993):
[lI]n China, there has always been the practice of "filial piety" in order to allow the aged
to live happily in their remaining years....
But the epoch has changed, and ideas are changing. With the development of human
society there has come new cultural thought-the life value theory. It says that hopeless
life can only bring about suffering, so it is not valuable. * * * *
One hopes that by the efforts of the experts in medicine, ethics and law and the public,
active euthanasia will become acceptable to the people of the world.
See also Shi Da Pu, "Euthanasia in China: A Report," 16 J. Med. Phil. 131 (199 1)(reporting
physicians' acceptance of the practice).
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Things have reached the point in the Netherlands where, owing to the
leniency of the authorities, the rate of voluntary, active euthanasia has
increased rapidly in recent years. That practice accounted for at least 2.3%
of all deaths in 1995.185 Half of all Dutch doctors have performed
euthanasia. 186 And, demonstrating that Holland has descended to the next
level of horror, many of these deaths are involuntary or not based on
sufficient consent.18 7 Fully 0.7% of deaths involved ending the patient's
life without the patient's explicit, concurrent request.18 8  In 48% of these
"no explicit, concurrent request" cases the physician had no information
establishing that the patient had expressed a wish for euthanasia. 189  It
184. See Carlos F. Gomez, Regulating Death: Euthanasia and the Case of the
Netherlands (199 1); John Keown, "Euthanasia in the Netherlands: Sliding Down the Slippery
Slope?," 9 Notre Dame J. L. Ethics& Pub. Pol 'y. 407 (1995) [hereinafter Keown, "Slippery
Slope"]; authorities cited in FitzGibbon & Lai, supra note 179, at 166 n.171.
185. See Paul J. van der Maas, Gerrit van der Wal, Ilinka Haverkate, Carmen L.M. de
Graaff, John G.C. Kester, Bregje D. Onwuteaka-Philipsen, Agnes van der Heide, Jaqueline
M. Bosma, & Dick D. Willems, "Euthanasia, Physician-Assisted Suicide, and Other Medical
Practices Involving the End of Life in the Netherlands, 1990-1995," 335 New Eng. J. Med.
1699, 1700 (1996):
In the interview study 2.3 percent of all deaths resulted from euthanasia, as compared
with 2.4 percent in the death-certificate study. In 1990 the rates were 1.9 and 1.7
percent, respectively. Assisted suicide occurred in 0.4 percent of deaths in the interview
study and 0.2 percent of deaths in the death-certificate study, as compared with 0.3 and
0.2 percent, respectively, in 1990.
This study is criticized, and its darker implications are explored, in Herbert Hendin, Chris
Rutenfrans, & Zbigniew Zylicz, "Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in the
Netherlands," 277 JAMA 1720 (1997).
186. G.H. Blijham, "The Person from Porlock. Ethical Issues in Terminal Care: The
Dutch Perspective," 3 Support Care Cancer 61 (1995). See also van der Mass, van der Wal,
Haverkate, de Graaff, Kester, Onwuteaka-Philipsen, van der Heide, Bosma & Willems, supra
note 185, at 1701 (reporting that 53% of Dutch physicians interviewed said they had
performed euthanasia, and that 29% confirmed that they had done so during the previous 24
months).
187. See Keown, "Slippery Slope," supra note 184, at 426-32:
If one includes cases in which the patient's death is referred to as part of what the
doctor aimed to achieve, then the total number of intentional killings by doctors [in the
Netherlands in 1990] may not be far short of 26,350, in 15,258 (58%) of which the
patient had not explicitly asked for death to be hastened.
Id. at 431-32.
188. See van der Mass, van der Wal, Haverkate, de Graaff, Kester, Onwuteaka-Philipsen,
van der Heide, Bosma & Willems, supra note 185, at 1700.
189. Id. at 1701. See also Loes Pijnenborg, Paul J. van der Maas, Johannes J.M. van
Delden, & C.W.M. Looman, "Life-Terminating Acts without Explicit Request of Patient,"
341 Lancet 1196 (1993).
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appears that in some such cases the physician omitted to discuss the matter
even with colleagues and nurses.
19°
According to leading Dutch authorities, "once one accepts euthanasia and
assisted suicide, the principle of universalizability forces one to accept
termination of life without explicit request." 191 "(S]ome of the legal
authorities in the Netherlands now openly condone non-voluntary euthanasia
in certain circumstances." 192 A substantial body of Dutch medical
opinion now favors the practice, when "quality of life" considerations
suggest it, of terminating the lives of babies. 19- This may in fact have
been done in some cases.1 9
4
7. What About Implications for the Law?-Assisting someone to kill
himself, like committing euthanasia, is an act of homicide. Except to the
extent that the law may have been modified by modem reforms of the type
discussed in this article, it constitutes a felony.
Although more and more of Anglo-American law has become plasticized,
"fact-sensitive," malleable before circumstances, the law of homicide has not
displayed such characteristics. 195 Although more and more of the law has
become "economic," accepting utility as a guide; and libertarian, accepting
the consent of affected parties as the prime determinant, the law of homicide
has generally remained firmly nonconsequentialist and moralistic. Anglo-
American courts have not, for example, embraced the principle that appears
in Dutch euthanasia cases accepting that a force majeure" or necessity
defense is established by patient suffering. 19 Anglo-American law has
traditionally been uncompromising about the defense of innocent human life.
190. See van der Mass, van der Wal, Haverkate, de Graaff, Kester, Onwuteaka-Philipsen,
van der Heide, Bosma & Willems, supra note 185, at 1701- 02.
191. Johannes J.M. Van Delden, Loes Pijnenborg, & Paul J. van der Maas, "The
Remmelink Study Two Years Later," 23 Hastings Ctr. Rep., Nov-Dec. 1993, at 24..
192. Keown, Slippery Slope, supra note 184, at 439.
193. Zier Versluys & Richard de Leeuw, "A Dutch Report on the Ethics of Neonatal
Care," 21 J. Med. Ethics 14 (1995):
The Dutch Pediatric Association reports consensus among its members regarding the
necessity to take the future quality of life into account when reaching decisions
regarding the continuation or dis-continuation of life-prolonging treatment. The
paramount importance of the discussion with the parents is stressed. Dissension exists
regarding active euthanasia in the newborn, both opinions being respected. If dissension
exists within the profession parents should be informed and if necessary referred to a
doctor who shares their moral views.
194. See Simons, supra note 141 (referring to "incidents [of euthanasia] when people
have not explicitly asked for death, like those involving a comatose patient or severely
deformed newborn babies").
195. See John M. Finnis, "Bland: Crossing the Rubicon?," 109 L.Q. Rev. 329 (1993).
196. See generally Keown, "Slippery Slope," supra note 184; Johan Legemaate, "Legal
Aspects of Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide in the Netherlands, 1973-1994," 4 Cam. Q.
Health Care Ethics 112 (1995).
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It has not accepted consent as a defense to the law of homicide. It has not
accepted consent as a defense to the crime of mutilating assault. It has
traditionally not accepted considerations of the "meaninglessness" or
sufferings of a life as reasons for destroying it.
Proponents of assisted-suicide reforms thus aim to modify the law of
homicide at its most fundamental level. Their proposed reforms introduce
the principle that killing may or may not be illicit depending on the extent
to which the subject may have gone along with the project and the extent
to which the subject's life was a worthwhile one. Accept these views and
euthanasia is the next likely step. And further permissiveness about killing
can be defended by developing more elastic ideas about what constitutes
sufficient subject consent (for example in the case of minors or
incompetents) and what constitutes a "meaningless" or insufferable life.
What about a life that is perceived as not worthwhile owing to nonphysical
"pain": depression, for example? Or a life which is judged unsatisfactory
according to criteria other than pain: criteria, for example, which look to the
subject's social integration (whether he is "wanted"). Or even criteria which
look to where he stands in relation to the political order.
In the wake of the Holocaust, it was largely uncompromising Anglo-
American legal doctrines which justified the Nuremberg trials and the
international conventions which followed.
Undermine them at our peril.
8. What About Wider Social and Political Implications?-Perhaps a very
large population would come to take advantage of the services contemplated
by assisted-suicide programs. 197 A recent study finds that 55% of HIV-
infected patients had considered physician-assisted suicide for
themselves. 198 Substantial desire for death or interest in suicide has also
been reported among cancer patients. 199
What of the changes that may be wrought in the larger communities
affected: on a town, for example, by the practice of suicide among some of
197. See Jay A. Jacobson, Evelyn M. Kasworm, Margaret P. Battin, Jeffrey R. Botkin,
Leslie P. Francis, & David Green, "Decedents' Reported Preferences for Physician-Assisted
Death: A Survey of Informants Listed on Death Certificates in Utah," 6 . Clinical Ethics
149, 150 (1995)("about 16 percent of decedents reportedly would have wanted either
physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia"). A large increase in the number of patients seeking
active euthanasia or physician-assi sted suicide in the Netherlands is reported in van der Mass,
van der Wal, Haverkate, de Graaff, Kester, Onwuteaka-Philipsen, van der Heide, Bosma &
Willems, supra note 185, at 1700.
198. William Breithart, Barry D. Rosenfeld & Steven D. Passik, "Interest in Physician-
AssistedSuicide Among Ambulatory HIV-Infected Patients," 153 Am. J. Psychiatry 238, 239
(1996). Cf. H-M. Laane, "Euthanasia, Assisted Suicide and AIDS," 7 AIDS Care S163
(1995)("The calculated overall incidence of euthanasia/assisted suicide among [persons with
AIDS) in Amsterdam is about 26%.").
199. See Harvey Max Chochinov, Keith G. Wilson, Murray Enns, Neil Mowchun, Sheila
Lander, Martin Levitt & Jennifer C. Clinch, "Desire for Death in the Terminally 111," 152
Am. .. Psychiatry 1185 (1995); Emanuel, supra note 125, at 1808.
259
260 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF JURISPRUDENCE (1997)
its residents? Some communities have reported the occurrence of "copy-cat"
suicides.
200
And what of the effects on our public morality, and our sense of what we
owe one another and what we stand for as a national community and as a
wider civilization? The understanding that every man's death diminishes
me; that human life is sacred; that social and political institutions have a
trust looking towards the preservation of life-these elements have been
hard won across history and have in this century been subjected to both
violent assault and quiet vitiation. Alter practice as regards preserving life
and you go a long way towards altering the principle that it deserves to be
preserved.
The poor, the vulnerable, and the elderly are notoriously neglected in
many parts of the health-care system. An important American Medical
Association study released recently underlines this concern as applied to
dying patients:
Hospice is mostly available to adults with .. families with enough
wealth to provide unpaid care indefinitely .... [The] homeless, [or]
isolated . ..are regularly excluded .... * * * Expertise in pain
management is often not available to patients, and comprehensive and
enduring care is the exception. * * * In the current system of care, many
dying persons suffer needlessly, burden their families, and die isolated
from family and community.201
An increasingly uncaring attitude towards the poor and the elderly can be
detected today in many quarters. If assisted suicide were made legal, it is
not unlikely that we would eventually encounter the argument, "if they are
so badly off they can always get a physician-assisted suicide. 202 "Why
200. See Block & Billings, supra note 104, at 446:
Practitioners report anecdotally that recent attention to legislative proposals for
legalization of euthanasia, the publication of Final Exit, and widely reported cases of
assisted suicide appear to be associated with increased frequency of such requests.
These impressionistic data are reinforced by the evidence of recent increase in suicide
rates among Danish patients and by a study that documented an increase in the
frequence of suicide by asphyxiation, as recommended in Final Exit, following the
book's publication.
(References omitted.) But see Brent, Perper, Moritz, Allman, Schweers, Roth Balach,
Cannobio, & Liotus, supra note 148 (unable to detect a "copy-cat" effect).
201. Council on Scientific Affairs, American Medical Association, supra note 157, at
476,477. The report notes that terminally ill patients "with serious pain might be effectively
treated for an intent to commit suicide by having effective pain treatment." Id. at 475.
202. See also Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 826 (9th Cir.
1996)("[W]e are reluctant to say that, in a society in which the costs of protracted health care
can be so exorbitant, it is improper for competent, terminally ill adults to take the economic
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respond to calls for better palliative care and pain management" and "why
spend money for hospices: they are uneconomical because they will only
diminish the numbers of people choosing suicide."
203
Such consequences are especially likely where the medical profession is
recruited into the projects of death. A policy generally applied by doctors,
in the hospitals to which we entrust our sick friends and where we have our
babies, will come to be wrapped with the authority of the physician's
prestige as a minister to the body and an anciently recognized guardian of
health.
This prestige helped the Nazis conceal the Holocaust and surround it with
an aura of respectability:
The key word in the healing-killing reversal [at Auschwitz] is
Sonderbehandlung, or "special treatment"... . [T]his euphemism for
killing insinuated something on the order of medical therapy, along with
a standing that was "more legal than legal." In general bureaucratic
usage, "special" [the prefix] was the opposite of "regular": special trains
and regular trains, special courts and regular courts, etc. Special
procedures were deemed necessary because of special conditions. The
word not only detoxified killing and aided in this routinization but, at the
same time, infused that killing with a near-mystical priority for the
"Auschwitz self' in carrying it out. Killing assumed a certain feeling of
necessity and appropriateness, enhanced by the medical, as well as the
military, aura surrounding it.
2 °4
welfare of their families and loved ones into consideration."), rev 'd. sub nom. Washington
v. Glucksberg, 117.S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
203. See American Nurses Association, supra note 166, at 3 ("The availability of assisted
suicide could foreseeably weaken the goal of providing quality care for the dying"); Hendin,
Rutenfrans, & Zylicz supra note 185:
[Eluthanasia, intended originally for the exceptional case, has become an accepted way
of dealing with serious or terminal illness in the Netherlands. In the process, palliative
care is one of the casualties, while hospice care lags behind that of other countries. For
the Dutch, accepting the option of euthanasia seems to be costing them the opportunity
to take advantage of the developments in palliative care of the past decade.
204. Robert Jay Lifton, The Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing and the Psychology of
Genocide, 150-51 (1986) (the bracketed words "the prefix" are also present, bracketed, in the
original).

